Globalization, Revising The Terms Of Trade, And The Return Of 'History' by Hughes, Justin
GLOBALIZATION, REVISING THE TERMS OF
TRADE, AND THE RETURN OF 'HISTORY'
JUSTIN HUGHES*
I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, American political leaders, commentators, and scholars
have complained about unfair trading practices in the global economy
and talked about the need to address the United States' chronic trade
deficits. That narrative has included a political kabuki in which
candidates for federal offices make loud promises to "level the playing
field" in international trade-and then, once in office, quickly change
their tune or find other issues to fill their dance card. Being keen
observers of American politics, both foreign governments and
multinational corporations caught on-and have come to expect that the
political growl from Washington on these issues would rarely, if ever, be
followed by a bite.'
The Trump Administration changed that narrative. Counter to what
practically any tactician would have advised, in 2017 the Trump team
simultaneously initiated trade disputes with practically all of America's
major trading partners. The disputes were so loud and blunt that, for a
time, it seemed that President Trump was intent on dismantling the global
trading system.2
* Honorable William Matthew Byrne, Jr. Professor of Law, Loyola Law School,
Loyola Marymount University. My thanks to Joshua Edgar Alegado for his excellent
research assistance with this piece. My thanks also to Daniel Chow, Mark Cohen,
Rod Hunter, Ian Sheldon, Seagull Song, and some anonymous reviewers who read
and commented on earlier drafts of this manuscript
'See, e.g., Jane Perlez, China Is Confronting New U.S. Hostility. But Is it Readyfor
the Fight?, N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 23, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/23/world/asia/china-us-trade-war.html ("Chinese
scholars often observe that new American presidents usually take a hard line against
China but seek cooperation after realizing how the two nations need each other.
President Trump has stunned them by defying that pattern.").
2 See, e.g., Edward Luce, How America's Friends and Enemies have Adjusted to the
Age of Trump, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 22, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/9bfb6c8-56d2-11e7-80b6-9bfa4clf83d2. The Chinese
government certainly sought to portray Trump's efforts this way. See Editorial, World
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The response of the policy establishment o these early Trump moves
was a sort of panic at the disco. There was (a) a strong reaction against
Trump's efforts to achieve improved trade deals coupled with (b) a
relentless, often simplistic defense of the post-1947 liberalized trading
system. That defense is largely justified, but it has been disheartening to
see a general refusal among establishment voices to engage the deep
questions Trump's actions should provoke-questions about the benefits
and costs of globalization, questions on whether and how the United
States might be able to improve meaningfully its terms of trade with the
rest of the global economy.
By mid-2019, the Trump administration had successfully revised
America's trade deal with South Korea, negotiated a new NAFTA,
3 and
held to a trade truce with the European Union.' All this made the outlook
for the global trading system seem considerably less apocalyptic.
Although there were occasional blow-ups on other fronts, the White
House's 2019 efforts seemed focused specifically on America's trade
relationship with China.
What does all the 2017-2019 turmoil in international trade mean for
the business community? Part II below looks at how both leading news
organizations and scholarly commentators ought-often with simplistic
and/or misleading rhetoric-to defend international trade and to critique
the Trump Administration's argument that the United States should
deemphasize geopolitics in order to get a better deal from the global
trading regime. We will never know whether President Trump could
have achieved a genuine re-evaluation of the trade regime on these terms,
precisely because the debate has now focused on the China-U.S.
Must Resist US Wrecking Trade System, CHINA DAILY (June 18, 2018),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201806/1
8/WS5b2 7b74 2a3 1001Of8f59d70a.html;
Dan Steinbock, Tariffs Undoing America's Future, CHINA DAILY (June 21, 2018,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201806/21/WS5b
2ad9e2a3103349141dd642.html;
Andrew Moody, Keeping Order, CINA DAILY (Sept. 25, 2018),
http://en.ccg.org.cn/html/top-issues/2534.html; Steven Lee Myers, Why China Is
Confident It Can Beat Trump in a Trade War, N.Y.TIMEs (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/05/world/asia/china-trade-war-trump-tariffs.html
("The state media has depicted [Trump] as a reckless bully intent on undermining the
global trading system.").
IJim Tankersley, Trump Just Ripped Up NAFTA. Here's What's in the New Deal,
N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/business/trump-
nafta-usmea-differences.html.
' Valentina Pop, Vivian Salama & Bob Davis, U.S., Europe Call a Truce on Trade,
WALL ST. J., July 26, 2018, at A1.
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relationship. Part III then explores the trade dispute between the Trump
Administration and China, first as an economic dispute and then as part
of a larger geo-political struggle. In this arena, the Trump Administration
has succeeded in changing the terms of the debate: there is now less effort
by establishment voices to discuss trade with China as purely about
business and greater acceptance that trade will occur-as it always has-
in the midst of a geo-political and ideological competition. Whereas the
Trump team initially wanted to put geopolitics aside to force better trade
deals, it is precisely awareness of the geopolitics that is forcing
reassessment and long-term changes in the China-U.S. economic
relationship.
1. THE ESTABLISHMENT PANICS OVERPAXAMERICANA
One indication of how much Donald Trump's election seemed to
threaten the international order was the return of the phrase Pax
Americana. The post-World War II "American Peace" has centered on
economic strengthening and military defense of western democracies,
development of strong international institutions, and a general thickening
of international legal norms-on everything from child custody to
chlorofluorocarbons. Pax Americana has always meant much more than
peace: it has meant promotion of democratic institutions, free and fair
elections, human rights, market economies, and connecting all those, the
rule of law. Pax Americana has also meant, to some degree, the United
States "remak[ing] the world in its own image"; 6 it has also been, in the
' Usage of "Pax Americana" largely faded after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but
under threat of the Trumpian moment, the phrase returned-to describe succinctly
what is at risk. See, e.g., Carla Norrlof, America-FirstIdeology will Trigger
American Decline, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Nov. 14, 2016),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/america-first-ideology-will-trigger-
american-decline/article32837024/; Ben Zimmer, From Rome's Reign to 'Pax
Americana', WALL ST. J, Dec. 10, 2016, at C4; Max Boot, Pax Americana on Its Last
Legs; The US. has been the Leading Champion ofFree Trade and Democracy.
Trump Wants None oflt, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2017, at 25; Roger Cohen, Pax
Americana is Over, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2016, at 21; Jacob Heilbrunn, WillPax
Germania Replace Pax Americana?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2017, at 15; Luce, supra
note 2 (noting that Pax Americana held "with a few ups and downs" even after the
Soviet Union collapsed).
6 Luce, supra note 2.
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words of one (admittedly American) Nobel laureate, "the most benign
great-power domination in history."'
Restoring international trade to its pre-1939 (and pre-1929) levels
was always an integral part of Pax Americana. In the aftermath of WWII
the United States consistently viewed economic development-
including through trade-as a means to stabilize representative
democratic governments. As the U.S. settled into a cold war with the
Soviet Union, it was clear that increasing the economic wealth of Europe
and Japan would make them better able to pay for their own defense
(against communism) and, thereby, reduce America's global burden.
Economic wealth through free markets in Latin America, east Asia, and
Africa would make the centralized economic model preached by the
Soviet Union less appealing.
All this was also compatible with America's own history. When the
Founders met in Philadelphia in 1787, eliminating the power of the 13
states to levy tariffs on imports and exports among themselves was part
of the agenda. As the historian John Truslow Adams wrote in his 1931
classic The Epic ofAmerica,
The forbidding of the States to levy any import or
export duties was to make the United States within
itself the greatest free-trade area in the world
eventually, and greatly to increase the possibilities of
national prosperity, the scale of American business,
and to intensify national solidarity.8
When debating tariffs, the Founders focused on fairness between the
states, the practicalities of raising revenues, and political realities.
9 And
the Constitutional Convention's decision to forbid individual states from
'Paul Krugman, Pax Trumpiana, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2016),
https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/20
16/07/26/pax-trumpiana/.
"JAMES TRUSLOw ADAMS, TIE EPic OF AMERICA 109 (1931).
9JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 466-69 (Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1966)
(1840). This was a comment directed at New Jersey and Connecticut products being
exported from New York, New Hampshire products being exported from Boston, and
North Carolina tobacco leaving the country through Virginia. See id. at 498-501; see
also id. at 412. Comments about economic integration were oblique at best. See, e.g.,
id. at 544. The question of imports and exports was also bound up, at least in the
mind of delegates from southern states, with the issue of slavery. Id. at 409-10.
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levying imports or exports "seemed a menacing encroachment""o on
state sovereignty at the time. While supporting the elimination of levies
among the 13 states, James Madison believed that "regulation of
imports" would likely be needed for "revenue, domestic manufactures,
and procuring equitable regulations from other nations.""
Each of those issues-fairness, sovereignty, revenues, domestic
manufacturing-has been a concern for the Trump team. Yet these
historic concerns now seem to be lost or severely downplayed by both
our press and commentators.
A. HOW THE PRESS PRESENTS TRUMP AND TRADE
As the Trump administration began to unveil policies in early 2017,
it became clear that Trump's anti-trade rhetoric in the 2016 campaign
was more than campaign rhetoric. Demands for broad renegotiation of
the terms of trade were leveled at Canada, China, South Korea, and
Mexico; higher steel and aluminum tariffs were imposed or threatened to
be imposed against all those countries as well as the European Union,
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, and South Korea;1 2 prohibitively high tariffs
were threatened on automobiles from Canada, Mexico, and Europe;"
tariffs on billions of dollars of imports from China were imposed; and the
United States withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade deal
it had reached with 11 countries.
President Trump's moves on international trade provoked different
reactions from the establishment, practically none positive. A Financial
10 ADAMS, supra note 8, at 109.
" MADISON, supra note 9, at 499-500.
12 On March 8, 2018, President Trump signed an order to impose higher tariffs on all
steel and aluminum imports effective after 15 days; the order included a temporary
carve-out provision for the EU, Canada, Mexico, Australia, Argentina, Brazil and
South Korea. The tariffs were later imposed on Canada, the EU, and Mexico at the
end of May. See generally Heather Long, Trump has Officially Put More Tariffs on
U.S. Allies than on China, WASH. POST, June 1, 2018, at A13; Jim Brunsden & Shawn
Donnan, US Grants Last-Minute Exemptions to Looming Steel Tariffs, FIN. TIMES
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/fac4f67a-2db7-11e8-a34a-
7e7563b0b0f4; John Fritze, Canada, EU, Mexico Balk as Trump Imposes Tarifs on
Steel, Aluminum, USA TODAY, June 1, 2018, at 4B; Editorial, Trump's Steel
Destruction, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2018, at A14.
" Pierre-Yves-Dugua, Trump menace 'automobile europdenne, LE FIGARO, June 23,
2018, at 24 (describing European concerns about Trump's threat of a 20% tariff on
automobiles).
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Times editorial gives a sense of these different strands-and of a global
elite frothing at the mouth over Trump:
If one sat down and made a determined effort, it would
be hard to come up with a more economically wrong-
headed, diplomatically toxic, and legally destructive
negotiating position than that presented to China last
week by a visiting US trade delegation.'4
First and perhaps foremost, there has been the procedural objection
to Trump's style-his undiplomatic bluntness, inconsistency, and
apparent lack of command of facts. Substantively, there has been at least
three levels of complaints. First, there is the complaint that Trump does
not understand geo-politics and how deeply corrosive his trade agenda is
on the post-1947 multilateral trading system, America's network of
alliances, and the post-WWII global order generally. This is the concern
for Pax Americana. Second, there have been the substantive objections
that President Trump simply does not understand the benefits of
international trade (or basic macroeconomics). Third, there have been
distinct clusters of criticisms based on country or region, i.e. how he has
mishandled Canada and Mexico, China, or the EU.
Let us focus on the second line of criticism: that President Trump
does not understand economics or the benefits of international trade. The
press is certainly correct to report on how higher tariffs may increase
prices for American consumers,' how retaliatory tariffs might cut off
markets or market expansion for U.S. concerns," and how foreign
investment in the U.S. creates jobs.' But there is also no mistaking the
fact that our major news organizations have often responded to Trump's
14 Editorial, Trump's Irrational Trade Demands on China, FIN.TIMES (May 8, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/22fB9cac-4fbc-11e8-a7a9-37318e776bab.
" See, e.g., Andrew Tangel, Business News: Pricier T Seen as Tariffv Loom, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 26, 2018, at B3; Sarah Gardner, Trump' Tariff Will Increase Cost of
Fixing Your Car, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2018, at 2.
16 See, e.g., Michael Hiltzik, State's Dairies Getting Creamed in Trade War, L.A.
TIMEs (Oct. 28, 2018), https://enewspaper.latimes.com/infinity/articleshare.aspx?
guid=cd97247b-c6d4-4ac9-8a88-a33572a6e3b4; Ana Swanson, Trump's Trade Policy
is Lifting Exports of Canadian Lobsters, N.Y. TMEs (Nov. 12, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/12/business/trump-trade-lobster-canada.html.
17 See, e.g., Patricia Cohen, When Foreign Companies Are Making, Not Killing, U.S.
Jobs, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/06/business/
economy/chattanooga-foreign-investment.html.
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agenda with their own simplistic message that trade is good and the
Trump administration's efforts are misguided.
Sometimes, stories have simply misrepresented the economics in
their haste to criticize the Trump agenda. Consider a 2017 Los Angeles
Times story called, Why Trump's obsession with trade deficits is
misguided which tried to lessen the significance of the trade deficit with
Mexico this way: "[t]he trade gap with Mexico, for example, looks very
big-$63 billion last year. But the reality is that about 40% of the value
of the goods imported from Mexico is made in the U.S."" Thejournalist
literally did not understand that the "40%" was already counted as U.S.
exports and he was, in effect, trying to minimize the size of the deficit by
counting U.S. exports twice.19
In 2017 and 2018, there was a range of hyperbolic stories and/or
headlines in major newspapers, making little or no effort to explain the
economic complexities of trade. Needa Hip? It May Cost You More was
one New York Times headline with the subheading "the White House's
tariff list targets many Chinese-made medical devices and drugs."20 The
actual story was a breezier "we just don't know" based on China having
a 12% share of U.S. medical device imports.21 Many stories - or at least
headlines-seem intent on casting the Trump trade agenda in a negative
light. The header of one New York Times story read that a year after
increased tariffs on washing machines "prices are up, sales have fallen
and stock prices are down," but the actual article described Home Depot
as saying that its washing machine sales are recovering and are "on par,
if not slightly better, than the average of our overall appliance
business."2 2 A Los Angeles Times story on the revised NAFTA deal has
the headline Trade deal would hurt autos, reportfinds but the actual story
reported that an International Trade Commission study predicted "1,500
1 Don Lee, Why Trump's Obsession with Trade Deficits is Misguided, L.A. TIMES,
May 4, 2017, at 2.
1 Email correspondence between the author and Don Lee, June 17, 2017 (on file with
the author).
20 Sheila Kaplan and Katie Thomas, Need a lip? It May Cost You More, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 2018, at Bl.
21 Id
22 Jim Tankersley, Tarifs Tossed a Market Right into a Spin Cycle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 2018, at BI. And given that washing machines are capital goods, if a modest
price increase substantially impacts sales, might not that suggest hat people were
replacing their washing machines too soon?
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jobs lost in vehicle production" that "would be offset by a gain in almost
30,000 jobs in [auto] parts production."23
The preference for hyperbole over explanation was evident in another
Los Angeles Times article, this one detailing a whole series of consumer
goods prices that might increase, including the cost of dinner at home-
everything from silverware to Chinese tilapia. The article added
"[w]ashing it all down with apple juice or Chinese wine will cost an extra
10% too."24 Even mentioning Chinese wine seems bizarre: almost no
one in the U.S. drinks Chinese wine (and if they are, they are not getting
the benefits of global trade). On the other hand, it is true that the United
States imports a lot of apple juice from China. China supplies roughly
2/3 of the apple juice concentrate imported into the U.S.,
25 while Canada
supplies most of the not-from-concentrate apple juice by a factor of
almost 8 to 1.26 Argentina, Chile, Germany, Mexico, Poland, and Turkey
are all significant apple producers with limited imports into the U.S.
market27 with Poland and Turkey substantially increasing their
concentrate exports to the U.S. between 2016 and 2017.28 So, would
increased tariffs on Chinese apple juice cause an increase in prices? Or
prevent or moderate price reductions that would otherwise occur from
increased supplies? Or just shift suppliers to the U.S. market? Or shift
consumption from concentrate to not-from-concentrate? Nothing so
complex is mentioned, let alone explained, in the typical major
newspaper story on international trade and the Trump Administration.
23 Bloomberg, Trade Deal Would Hurt Autos, Report Finds, L.A.TIMES, Apr. 19,
2019, at C6.
24 Bruce Einhorn and Angus Whitley, Trump Trade was About to Hit Home, L.A.
TIMES, July 12, 2018 at Cl.
25 Tom Hurson, Apple Juice Roundtable USA, Apple Crop Outlook & Marketing
Conference, USAPPLE Ass'N (2017), http://usapple.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/AppleJuicePanelTomHurson.pdf.
26 Caroline Calder, USA - Fruit Juice Imports, FRUIT JUICE Focus, (Nov. 16, 2017,
http://www.fruitjuicefocus.com/usa-fruit-juice-imports/). In the most recent reporting
period, one industry observer reports that Canada provided 8,143 tons of not-from-
concentrate apple juice imports into the U.S. market while China provided 1,068 tons,
noting that Canada sent "nearly eight times the amount shipped into the US from its
nearest competitor China." Id.
2 7 Id
28 Hurson, supra note 25.
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Occasionally, a more thoughtful approach appeared in the media, as
when the New York Times ran a news analysis story that offered, in the
second paragraph, the following:
The emerging trade war between the United States and
China has prompted predictions of severe economic
and geopolitical disruption. But for any given
industry, the impact of tariffs depends on the
microeconomics of its products: How much does
demand change when prices rise? Are substitutes
readily available? How much extra productive
capacity is there around the world, and how long
would it take to get new manufacturing facilities up
and running?2 9
The writers added: "[t]he lesson that emerged: be skeptical about
predictions of radical disruption to major industries in the near term. For
now, companies have options to avoid some of the most severe risks."3 0
It is hard to understand why our major news organizations have not
been consistently this thoughtful. Indeed, barely a year later-and with
the American economy growing at a fast clip despite increased tariffs-
The New York Times was back to telling readers "huge swaths of the
American economy depend on access to the Chinese market for
materials, products and sales."3 '
Perhaps since President Trump has a simple message on trade, the
press in the United States (and the UK) have felt compelled to respond
with their own simplified narrative, one in which more international trade
is always good and higher tariffs are always bad. Three things are
deemphasized in this narrative: discussions of how tariffs may benefit
industrial production and employment, considerations of how free trade
affects the mix of full-time jobs, and accounts of how our trading partners
use subsidies and other policy tools more extensively than the United
2 9 Neil Irwin, Alexandra Stevenson, & Claire Ballentine, What a Trade War With




31Ana Swanson & Keith Bradsher, Trump Threatens China with More Tarifs Ahead
ofFinal Trade Talks, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/business/trump-tariffs-china-trade-talks.html.
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States does-precisely in order to promote (and protect) production and
employment.
On the first of these, if higher tariffs are part of a successful
economic sector, the tariffs will often be ignored. An example of this was
a two-page August 2018 story in The Economist about "[h]ow the auto
industry is coping with Donald Trump's trade wars." The article starts
with the state of the most successful American model:
THE Ford F-150 pickup truck has been America's
bestselling vehicle for years. In Dearborn, a city near
Detroit, a factory that once produced Henry Ford's
Model A now cranks out one of these all-aluminum
tributes to testosterone every 53 seconds. The F-150 is
so profitable-informed rumors suggest that each one
adds nearly $13,000 to Ford's bottom line-that it is
known around town as "the bank."3 2
The Economist article then discusses support in Michigan for Trump's
policies, how Trump steel tariffs are raising input costs for U.S.
automakers, how very globalized the American automobile industry is,
how "[s]ales, especially of trucks and SUVs, are still strong," and that
"[e]veryone is analyzing exposure, everyone is concerned.""
What is left unmentioned-from start (the F-150 pickup truck's
popularity and profitability) to finish (strong sales of trucks and SUVs}-
is that trucks and SUVs are built in America behind a 25% tariff.
34 That
tariff is ten times higher than the 2.5% tariff for passenger automobiles:
it is very much the reason that truck and SUV production in the United
States is robust, while passenger automobile production is a mixed story.
Similarly, an April 2019 story in The Wall Street Journal about the
"surge" in small SUV sales noted "[c]ar makers tend to make more
money on sport-utility vehicles, mostly because they can command
32 How Americas Car Industry is Coping with Trade Disputes, THE EcONOMIST




34 Michael Hiltzik, On Layoffs and Tariff, GM and Trump Both are Flagrantly
Dishonest, L.A. TIMEs (Nov. 30, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/
hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-gm-layoffs-20181130-story.html ("GM, and its fellow U.S.
carmakers, have profited handsomely from ... a 25% tariff that has blocked the
imports of foreign-made pickups, SUVs, and vans for 56 years.... [T]hat market has
become its bread and butter.").
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higher prices than sedans for little extra cost"3 5-all without one word
about the higher prices being related to the tariff. Despite the 25% tariff,
no one writes about Americans suffering from a shortage of SUVs, either
in number or variety; commentators note just the opposite.36 Lastly, no
one writes about Americans paying too much for trucks and SUVs
because of tariffs.3 7
Similarly, there are few serious discussions about the negative effects
of international trade on employment-and how unevenly the pain is
spread. This is not the place for a full-blown discussion of trade-related
industrial expansions and contractions, jobs and unemployment, or
income inequality. But we know that the huge growth in imports from
China following its accession to the WTO correlated with a steep decline
in manufacturing jobs in the United States.3 8 While much of that decline
is the result of technology, it seems likely that somewhere between one
million and 2.5 million manufacturing jobs were lost directly because of
Chinese imports.39 As former commerce undersecretary and former dean
of the Yale School of Management Jeffrey Garten notes, international
3 Adrienne Roberts & Mike Colias, Small SUs Surge as Drivers Ditch Sedans,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 26, 2019, 10:37 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/small-suvs-
loom-larger-for-car-makers-11556184600.
6 Mike Colias, Ford Gets Liftfrom U.S. Truck DemandWALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2019,
at B3 (reporting "sharp gains" in sales "from the strength of its pickup truck and
sports-utility lineup in the U.S."); Roberts & Colias, supra note 35 (discussing
"Americans' growing preference for sports-utility vehicles" and new models being
introduced to meet that demand).
3 It should be added that the lower tariff on passenger cars (2.5%) tempers SUV
prices to the degree that many consumers will consider automobiles and SUVs
substitutable goods at some price point, i.e. if SUV prices rise too high, many
consumers would switch back to conventional passenger cars.
3 According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the United States had 17.3 million
manufacturing jobs in January 2000; by January 2004, that number was down to 14.3
manufacturing jobs, and the lowest number was reached in March 2010 with 11.45
million manufacturing jobs. The number has gradually risen since then to 12.83
million manufacturing jobs. See Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject:
Employment, Hours, and Earningfrom the Current Employment Statistics Survey
(National), U.S. DEP'T LAB. BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CES3000000001 (change "[fjrom" date to "2000").
39 
EDWARDALDEN, FAILURE TO ADJUST: How AMERICANS GOT LEFTBEHIND IN THE
GLOBALEcONOMY 31 (2017) ("Economic analysis that has looked at US regions
facing the greatest import competition suggests that the huge growth in ports from
China between 1999 and 2011 was likely responsible for the loss of somewhere
between 1 million and 2.5 million jobs during a decade in which overall US
manufacturing employment fell by nearly 6 million jobs.").
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trade without activist income redistribution has meant tens of millions of
Americans were "hit with low wage competition, outsourcing, lower paid
jobs, or unemployment" and "China, with its vast industrious labor force,
was the coup de grace for millions of US workers."40
Our major newspapers also provide little or no meaningful coverage
of how, as Edward Alden notes, "China, Korea, Japan, and most other
Asian countries subsidize their companies or protect their markets
through discriminatory regulations to gain an edge in global
competition."4' There is rarely any discussion of how America's
companies face highly subsidized competitors (like Europe's Airbus
42
40 Jeffrey E. Garten, Why Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders Are HalfRight About
Trade, FORTUNE (Mar. 29, 2016), https://fortune.com/2016/03/29/donald-trump-
bernie-sanders-trade/; see also Dani Rodrik, Globalization's Wrong Turn, FOREIGN
AFF. (June 11, 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/
2019-06-
11/globalizations-wrong-turn ("Increased trade with China and other low-wage
countries accelerated the decline in manufacturing employment in the developed
world, leaving many distressed communities behind.").
41 ALDEN,supra note 39, at 17.
42 While WTO panels ruled that both the US and EU provided illegal subsidies to their
respective aerospace champions, it appears that the EU subsidies to Airbus dwarf US
subsidies to Boeing by a ratio of somewhere between 2 to I and 4 to 1. EUPaid
Airbus Billions in Illegal Subsidies, WTO Rules, BBC (May 15, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-44120525 (reporting that European Countries
gave $22 billion in subsidies to Airbus); USTR Proposes Productsfor Tariff
Countermeasures in Response to Harm Caused by EU Aircraft Subsidies,OFF. OF THE
U.S. TRADE REP. (Apr. 8, 2019), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/2019/aprillustr-proposes-products-tariff; The WTO Dispute:
Airbus Advocates Fair and Balanced Trade, AIRBUS, https://www.airbus.com
/company/responsibility-sustainability/approach-responsible-business/WTO.htm
(follow "The EU Case against the U.S. - DS353" hyperlink), (reporting Boeing
received "USD 5-6 billion in WTO-inconsistent subsidies disbursed between 1989
and 2006"); The EU "repayable launch investment" loans that underwrote Airbus'
development of the A380, the failed jumbo jet, have turned out to be largely
government subsidies that will never fully be repaid. Sylvia Pfeifer, Airbus Signals
Tough Stance on A380 Loans, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/c74422ee-
4 102-1 Ie9-9bee-efab61506f44; Andreas Rinke
& Tassilo Hummel, Germany in Talks with Airbus on 600 Million Euros ofA380
Loans, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-airbus-
germany/germany-in-talks-with-airbus-on-
60 0 -million-euros-of-a380-loans-
idUSKCNIQLOYR ("Berlin originally loaned Airbus 942 million euros in 2002 for
the development of the A380, of which only a third has been repaid").
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and Korea's shipbuilding industry4 3) or regulatory discrimination (like in
China's financial markets). This is not to claim that the United States is
a pure market economy; we too subsidize preferred private entities, if
more modestly." The point is only that these observations were largely
absent as the American press responded to the Trump trade agenda.
B. Scholarly Analysis of the Trump Administration on Trade
The urge to pile on the criticisms of the Trump Administration and
overlook the complexities of trade has not been limited to journalists; it
has included our scholarly community, particularly those narrowly
focused on trade and economics. Ben Steil is an award-winning
economist who is director of international economics studies at the
Council on Foreign Relations; in other words, someone we should be
able to trust for careful economic analyses. Yet, he and co-author
Benjamin Della Rocca posted a March 2018 essay claiming Trump Steel
Tariffs Could Kill 45,000 Auto Jobs, Equal to One-Third of Steel
Workforce.45 To reach this initial conclusion, the economists
4 See Japan To Sue South Korea at WTO over Subsidies to Shipbuilders, JAPAN
TIMES (Nov. 6,2018), https://wwwjapantimes.co.jp/news/2018/11/06/business/japan-
sue-south-korea-wto-subsidies-shipbuilders/#.XNzBCC_MzMI.
" For example, U.S. agricultural subsidies appear to be significantly less than half the
subsidies that the EU provides to agricultural producers under the Common
Agricultural Policy (about 25 billion dollars versus 58+ billion euros). See The
Common Agricultural Policy at a Glance, EUR. COMM'N,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-agricultural-
policy/cap-glance en; Deborah White, WhatAre U.S. Farm Subsidies?, THOUGHTCO.
(Jan 27, 2019), https://www.thoughtco.com/us-farm-subsidies-3325162.
45 Although the blog post was revised, the initially reported number was used by
others. See, e.g., Study: Trump's Steel Tariffs Could Cost the U.S. Auto Industry
45,000 Jobs, GuARDIANS OF DEMOCRACY (Mar. 8, 2018), https://theguardiansof
democracy.com/study-trump-steel-tariffs-cost-u-s-auto-industry-45000-jobs/
("President Trump's decision to impose a 25 percent tariff on steel imports could cost
the U.S. auto industry 45,000 jobs ... according to a study by the Council on Foreign
Relations."); Trump Signs Metals Tariffs Sparing Some Allies, MARKETSCREENER
(Mar. 8, 2018, 7:38 PM), https://www.marketscreener.com/LME-ALTMINIJM-
CASH-16159/news/Trump-Signs-Metals-Tariffs-Sparing-Some-Allies-2-26133185/
('Trump steel tariffs could kill 45,000 auto jobs, equal to one-third of steel
workforce,' was the title of a blog item posted by Council on Foreign Relations
analysts shortly before the announcement."); Benn Steil and Benjamin Della Rocca,
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"estimate[d] that an average car requires 2.4 tons of steel to build."
4 6 The
problem is that the average car produced in America weighs only 2.046
tons in total (4093 pounds)47 and a substantial amount of this weight is
plastic, rubber, aluminum, and composite materials.
When the error was pointed out, Steil and Rocca changed their
estimates of job losses downward based on a car having 1.2 tons of
steel,48 but even this calculation proceeds on a flawed assumption. The
harmonized tariff system of the US (HTSUS) has 17,000+ product
categories, so any analysis based on the 1.2 tons of steel in a car being
classified as "steel" is likely to be wildly off. For example, all the
passenger vehicles produced by BMW at its South Carolina factory have
engines imported from Germany and Austria49-but those engines are
imported under "engine" tariff categories, not steel tariff categories.
They are presumably unaffected by higher tariffs on steel."o
Trump Steel Tarifs CouldKill 45,000 Auto Jobs, Equal to One-Third ofSteel
Workforce, HEDGEYE (Mar.9, 2018, 9:01 AM),
https://app.hedgeye.com/insights/6 6 132-trump-steel-tariffs-could-kill-45-000-auto-
jobs-equal-to-one-third-of ("Based on this relationship, we would expect a 4 percent
decline in sales to result in auto-industry job losses of 45,000 by the end of 2019.").
46Steil & Rocca, supra note 45.
47 U.S. ENTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-420-R-19-002, THE 2018 EPA AUTOMOTIVE
TRENDS REPORT: GREENHOUSE GAS EMIsSIONS, FUEL ECONOMY, AND TECHNOLOGY
SINCE 1975 (2019) ("Average model year 2017 weight was 4,093, which is up 58
pounds from model year 2016. The preliminary model year 2018 data suggest that
weight will be up 1 pound, or essentially unchanged."). The numbers include pickups
and SUVs. See id.
48 Benn Steil & Benjamin Della Rocca, Trump Steel Tarffy Could Kill Up to 40,000
Auto Jobs, Equal to Nearly One-Third of Steel Workforce, COUNCILON FOREIGN
REL.: GEO-GRAPICS (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/trump-steel-tafiffs-
could-kill40000-auto-jobs-equal-nearly-one-third-steel-workforce.
4 Amy Wilson, BMW's U.S. Plant Finds Its Calling as ExportHub, AUTOMOTIVE
NEWS EUR. (Oct. 31, 2017), https://europe.autonews.com/article/
2017103I/COPY/
311039994/bmw-s-u-s-plant-finds-its-calling-as-export-hub ("Engines used at
Spartanburg are imported from BMW plants in Austria and Germany.").
5o To get a sense of how off Steil and Rocca were in their quest to prove Trump's
policies wrong, they estimated loss of 40-45,000 jobs "in the U.S. auto industry"
based on the steel tariffs, but the Bureau of Labor Statistics actually estimates job
growth of 3500 jobs in automobile and automobile part manufacturing in the one-year
period since the imposition of the steel tariffs in March 2018. Databases, Tables &
Calculators by Subject: Employment, Hours, and Earningfrom the Current
Employment Statistics Survey (National), U.S. DEP'T LAB. BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
https://data.bis.gov/timeseries/CES30000
0 00 0 1.
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At least Steil and Rocca are economists attempting to work with
economic statistics in their criticism. In contrast, a 2019 op-ed by Nobel-
prize winner Paul Krugman argued that "Trump is Losing His Trade
Wars" without any data more meaningful than a Fox News poll.s As to
the revision of NAFTA, Krugman wrote that the "new agreement [is] so
similar to the old one that you need a magnifying glass to see the
differences."5 2 No mention of the International Trade Commission study
predicting a net gain of 28,000 jobs in the automobile manufacturing
sector. Indeed, Krugman's conclusion that the Trump Administration "is
losing" in its efforts to achieve improved trade deals came without any
meaningful analysis of the revised KORUS, the USMCA, or the
proposals China has put on the table.
A few scholars and commentators have attempted a broader analysis
of Trump trade policy, but this is not an easy task. President Trump's
most interesting communications about trade are short [by technical
specification], hastily released, and often quickly countermanded or
'clarified.' At the same time, the formal pronouncements of the Trump
Administration are often not that far from what we are accustomed to
hearing from Washington, both from political leaders and from think
tanks.
Using recent work by Daniel Chow and Ian Sheldon,53 let us consider
what more reflective commentary might discern about Trump trade
policy. In their effort to dig into administration policy, Chow and
Sheldon quote a long passage from USTR's National Trade Policy
Agenda paper which closes with the following:
Finally, we reject the notion that the United States
should, for putative geopolitical advantage, turn a
blind eye to unfair trade practices that disadvantage




5 Daniel C.K. Chow & Ian Sheldon, Is Strict Reciprocity Requiredfor Fair Trade?,
52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 1, 9 (2019); Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Daniel C.K.
Chow, The Perils ofEconomic Nationalism and a Proposed Pathway to Trade
Harmony, STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. (forthcoming 2019).
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American workers, farmers, ranchers, and businesses
in global markets.5 4
In his 2018 State of the Union address, President Trump similarly
pledged that "America has also finally turned the page on decades of
unfair trade deals that sacrificed our prosperity and shipped away our
companies, our jobs, and our Nation's wealth. The era of economic
surrender is over." 5 5
Chow and Sheldon identify this approach as new, but these statements
are not a novel and strange framework in which to understand US trade
relations. In 1987, Ronald Reagan said-in his State of the Union
Address-that "[w]e are always willing to be trade partners, but never
trade patsies." Presidential candidates have had even sharper words. A
few years earlier, when he was running against Reagan, former Vice-
President Walter Mondale said "[w]e've been running up the white flag
when we should be running up the American flag . . . What do we want
our kids to do? Sweep up around the Japanese computers?"56 In 2011,
candidate Mitt Romney said Presidents Bush and Obama "have been
played like a fiddle by the Chinese" and that the Chinese were "taking
our currency and taking our jobs and taking a lot of our future." 
7 Four
years earlier, when he was running for office, Obama called NAFTA "a
mistake" and said that "[tihe net costs of many of these trade agreements
... can be devastating."5 8
The USTR's express recognition that we have sometimes sought or
accepted trade arrangements for their "putative geopolitical advantage"
is more stating the obvious than laying out a dramatic new worldview.
When a USAID bag of rice donated to Malawi says, "GIFT OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE," that is the result of a balancing of economics
and geopolitical interests. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was
54 OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2017 TRADE POLicy AGENDA AND 2016 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS




" Donald J. Trump, U.S. President, State of the Union Address (Jan. 30, 2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-state-
union-address/.
56James Reston, Mondale's Tough Line, N.Y. TIMEs, October 13, 1982, at A31.
* Mitt Romney, U.S. Sen., GOP Debate at Dartmouth College (Oct 1, 2011),
https://senate.ontheissues.org/Archive/201 lGOPDartmouthMitt Romney.htm.
8 ALDEN, supra note 39, at 53.
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pretty clearly both an economic and a geopolitical project; to that end,
analysts believed that TPP involved giving up some of our manufacturing
interests5 9 to advance other economic and geopolitical interests. In this
sense, USTR's 2017 National Trade Policy Agenda did not announce a
radically new framework; it simply announced that the Trump
administration wants to make less investment in the geopolitical order
and focus more on our own economic well-being. One can criticize this
decision, but economic advantage versus geopolitical advantage has
always been a case-by-case calculus in American foreign relations, just
as advocacy of human rights and liberal democracy versus geopolitical
advantage has always been a case-by-case calculus.
As for specific elements of Trump's trade agenda, Chow and Sheldon
quote a passage from the same USTR policy paper saying that "the
overarching purpose" of Trump trade policy "will be to expand trade in
a way that is freer and fairer for all Americans," including actions that
"promote job creation in the United States, promote reciprocity with our
trading partners, strengthen our manufacturing base and our ability to
defend ourselves, and expand our agricultural and services industry
exports."60
This again seems pretty standard, except perhaps the references to
national defense and "promot[ing] reciprocity with our trading partners."
In the 2018 State of the Union address, President Trump similarly noted
that "we expect trading relationships to be fair and to be reciprocal"61
and Vice President Pence has used similar words repeatedly in stating
the administration's goals for China-U.S. relations.62
59 H.R. COMM, ON WAYS AND MEANS, 1 1 4 T CONG., TPP ISSUE ANALYSIS: TRADE IN
THEAUTOMOTIVE MANUFACTURING SUPPLY CHAIN13 (Comm. Print 2016),
https://waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/docu
ments/TPP/20lssue%2OAnalysis%20-%2OAutos.pdf (concluding that TPP would
have meant "that some auto parts that a recurrently produced in the United States for
incorporation into automobiles that are made in Canada or Mexico could be produced
in third countries such as China, Germany, or Thailand under TPP."); id. at 15 (After
noting that the 62.5% requirement for a NAFTA vehicle, finding that "[b]y contrast,
TPP has a lower overall content requirement for vehicles-45%. That alone creates
an incentive to source more parts outside the TPP region.")
60 Id.; Chow & Sheldon, supra note 53, at 9.
6 Donald J. Trump, State of the Union Address, supra note 55.
62 Mike Pence, U.S. Vice President, Remarks on the Administration's Policy Toward
China at the Hudson Institute (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.hudson.org/events/1610-
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With this idea of "reciprocity" as a springboard, Chow and Sheldon
develop what they believe are three assumptions underlying the Trump
trade strategy:
(1) "that international trade is a zero-sum game in which there can be
only one winner and one loser in every trade deal;"63
(2) that "in order for trade to be fair there must be strict reciprocity in
trade volumes or a trade balance between the United States and
its trading partners;"' and
(3) "that the terms and conditions of trade must be strictly reciprocal
in order to be fair," including that "[t]ariff rates must be mirror
images of each other."65
Again, Chow and Sheldon are to be commended for this effort to discern
the "assumptions" and principles of Trump trade policy. But are these
the right assumptions to read from tweets and more traditional tea leaves?
Consider the first assumption that for President Trump, "international
trade is a zero-sum game." This is where we need to parse the general
rhetoric of "unfair" trade from the rhetorical flourishes of how the "era
of economic surrender is over" (Trump, 2018) and foreigners are "taking
our currency and taking our jobs" (Romney, 2011). One can look at a
deal that is producing a substantial surplus and say it is "unfair" on the
grounds that, while each side is gaining, one side is gaining
disproportionately more. It is unfair because you didn't get as much of
vice-president-mike-pence-s-remarks-on-the-administration-s-policy-towards-
china102018 [hereinafter Pence, Hudson Institute Speech] ("We seek a relationship
grounded in fairness, reciprocity, and respect for sovereignty ... we will continue to
demand an economic relationship with China that is free and fair and reciprocal. .
6 Chow & Sheldon, supra note 53, at 5 ("[t]he first mistake is the assumption that
trade is a zero-sum game, suggesting that the country selling products abroad is a
winner while the one who buys is a loser. That's simply wrong."); id. at 16 (citing
Veronique de Rugy, How Trump Misunderstands Trade, N.Y. TIMES: OP. (April 10,
2018)), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/1O/opinion/trump-china-trade-deficit.htm
("Without explanation, the Trump Administration seems to just flatly ignore the large
body of theoretical and empirical work that supports the view of trade as a positive-
sum game.").
I Chow & Sheldon, supra note 53, at 5.
61Id. at 6.
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the surplus as you should have (however you want to define "should").
Such a conclusion does not misunderstand trade.
And there is plenty of evidence to indicate that Trump does believe
pre-2018 trade deals were "unfair" in that way. The revised "KORUS"
free trade agreement with South Korea and the new NAFTA
("USMCA") indicate that the Trump team does not consider trade a zero-
sum game. Treasury Secretary Mnuchin praised the revised KORUS as
a "win-win" for both countries66 and President Trump called USMCA "a
great deal for all three countries."67 One of President Trump's tweets
about negotiations with China was also telling: "China and the United
States are working well together on trade, but past negotiations have been
so one-sided in favor of China, for so many years, that it is hard for them
to make a deal that benefits both countries."68 This is not a statement
from someone who believe that international trade deals are invariably
zero-sum. But it is a statement consistent with Trump believing himself
the master of the "deal":69 successful business deals produce surplus for
both parties-it is just a matter of splitting that wealth.
Chow and Sheldon's third observation is that the Trump team wants
terms and conditions of trade to be "strictly reciprocal." Chow and
Sheldon criticize Trump's demand for the same ("mirror") tariff rates
among trading partners on the grounds that Trump "ignores the dynamics
of trade liberalization" and how trade liberalization is a process "where
policymakers trade off increased access to their own markets through
6 Alan Rappeport & Jim Tankersley, Trump Gets First Major Trade Deal as South
Korea Looks to Avoid Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/business/south-korea-us-tariffs.html.
" Heather Long, USMCA: Who are the Winner and Losers of the 'New NAFTA'?,
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/2018/10/01/winners-losers-usmca-trade-deal/ (quoting Donald Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 1, 2018, 3:30 AM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump?refsrc=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7CtwgrO/o5Eauthor
[hereinafter Trump Twitter]).
" Damien Paletta, et al., Penalties Against China Telecom Giant ZTE Become a
Bargaining Chip as White House, Chinese Officials Discuss Potential Trade Deal,
WASH.POST: THE SWITCH (May 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-switch/wp/2018/05/13/trump-pledges-to-help-chinese-phone-maker-zte-get-back-
into-business/?noredirect=on&utm term=.173d72c3fflf (quoting Trump Twitter,
supra note 67). President Trump ended his tweet with "But be cool. It will all work
out." Trump Twitter, supra note 67.




tariff cuts in exchange for access to export markets, i.e., the concerns of
those lobbying for the import-competing sectors are balanced by those
lobbying for the export-competing sectors."
7 0
Chow and Sheldon are certainly correct that five decades ofGATT
negotiations aimed at reciprocal, but not necessarily matching,
reductions in tariffs; this happened naturally as each negotiating party
sought to advance or defend its own commercial interests. 7But the fact
that decades of tariff negotiations focused on macro level reciprocity
does not make it wrong to focus on "micro" level reciprocity in
individual product and service categories.72 In fact, it is reasonable to
say that harmonization in the trade system should proceed from the
macro to micro levels. The "first-difference reciprocity" achieved in
GATT rounds was just a means to trade liberalization, not a sacred
outcome. Indeed, genuinelyfree trade "would imply full reciprocity of
market access."7 3 When tariffs on a product are zero on both sides of a
trading relationship-which is true "free trade"-the tariffs are
"reciprocal" and "mirror."
For years, any time the U.S. has considered a new trade deal, op-eds
and editorials have advocated these deals on the grounds that "our tariffs
are already low anyway, so we will only benefit," without people asking
the more basic question: why have American tariffs been so low
compared to most other countries? Again, after 1945, American
administrations wanted to promote trade liberalization as a means of
70 Chow & Sheldon, supra note 53, at 28 (citing Richard E. Baldwin, Multilateralizing
Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Free Trade, 29
WORLD EcoN. 1451, 1459-71 (2006)); see also Martin Wolf, Trump Declares Trade
War on China, FIN. TIMES (May 8, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/dd2af6b0-4fcI-
Il e8-9471-a083af05aea7 ("The demand that China have the same tariffs as the US is
almost as ridiculous. There is no economic case for such a policy. It would be far
more reasonable to demand that it move towards the same average tariff as the US or
EU.").
7 See, e.g., Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Douglas A. Irwin, The Return of the
Reciprocitarians-US Trade Policy Today, 10 WORLD ECON. 109, 117 (1987)
("Under the GATT, negotiations for trade liberalization generally focus on matching
concessions from the initial conditions. Thus reciprocity is sought at the margin, with
reciprocity of changes and reductions; that is, first-difference reciprocity.").
72 Id. (critiquing the idea "that the reciprocity of access must be met by individual
sectors, which is to say at micro and not just the overall macro level").
* Id. at 122 ("Moreover, first-difference reciprocity was a procedural device; the
implicit goal was free trade, more or less, which would imply full reciprocity of
market access.").
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strengthening allied economies. To that end, the U.S. agreed to lower
tariff rates than most of its trading partners and to have its tariffs "bound"
over a wider range of products than most GATT members. America did
this at a time when it was the overwhelming economic hegemon. As
Jagdish Bhagwati and Douglas Irwin have noted, during the first decades
following World War II, "[t]he United States, the undisputed force
majeure, looked the other way when it came to requiring GATT members
to accept symmetric obligations." 7 4 When USTR says that the Trump
Administration is de-emphasizing "putative geopolitical advantage,"
they are speaking about powerful, off-stage considerations that helped
motivate asymmetrical U.S. tariff concessions for decades.
But circumstances change and today, it is fair to ask if it makes sense
to have a trading system in which China has a 25% tariff on passenger
cars (perhaps reduced to 15% now) while the U.S. has a 2.5-4% tariff.
What is the justification for a trading system in which the U.S. has a 4%
ad valorum tariff on tires while some large economies have much higher
rates (Brazil = 16%, South Africa = 30%)? The Trump team's call for
truly reciprocal tariffs is a little different, but not that far from where the
United States has always been. What Bhagwati and Irwin observed in
the late 1980s remains true today: "today's reciprocitarians are well
within the American tradition of trade policy."s And demands for
"reciprocity" in international economic relations are not uniquely
American: in a major 2019 statement on EU-China relations, the
European Commission called for "greater reciprocity," "reciprocal
conditions," and/or "reciprocal trade" fourteen times in an 11-page
document.76
III. TRUMP, CHINA, AND THE CONTINUATION OF HISTORY
During the first two years of the Trump presidency, no trade dispute
loomed larger than the administration's showdown with China. As other
741 d "In the political interest of building a New Europe, for example, the United
States allowed asymmetry of access during the long period when Western Europe was
shifting to convertibility in current-account transactions.").
7 1 d. at 120.
7 6 See, e.g., Joint Communication by the European Commission and the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to The European
Parliament on EU-China -A strategic outlook, JOIN(2019) 4 final (Mar. 12, 2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-
strategic-outlook.pdf [hereinafter EU-China - A strategic outlook].
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revised trade agreements were reached, China became the trade issue-
and it appeared that the Trump Administration finally understood the
strategic wisdom of focusing on one or a limited set of trade issues.
The endless stream of stories about tariffs on China may make it
difficult to have a clear picture of the tariffs imposed by the United States
on Chinese products between January 2017 and summer 2019. What
follows is a summary, keeping in mind that when one names an amount
of Chinese imports affected, such numbers are historic. (Escalating
tariffs on one country's products should cause the amount of imports
from that country to drop as production shifts to other countries.) The
tariffs have been as follows:
Section 232. On 1 March 2018, the United States imposed an
additional 25% tariff on steel and 10% tariff on aluminum from all
countries, including China. The tariff increases were justified on
national security grounds, pursuant to two February 2018 Department
of Commerce reports under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act
of 1962.77 Over time, exemptions from the additional tariffs were
given to Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, the EU, Mexico, and
South Korea, 7 but the tariffs still apply to Chinese steel and
aluminum.
Section 301 - 2018 actions
In August 2017, the USTR began an investigation under Section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974 of China's activities in relation to American
intellectual property, including forced technology transfers and
7 U.S. DEPT. OF COM., SECRETARY Ross RELEASES STEEL ANDALUMINUM 232
REPORTS IN COORDINATION WITH WIIITE HOUSE(2018),
https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/
2 0 18/02/secretary-ross-releases-
steel-and-aluminum-232-reports-coordination (The investigations were conducted
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (Safeguarding national security)).
* David Yanofsky, Trumps Steel and Aluminum Tariffs Will Now Exempt Most of US
Imports, QUARTZ (Mar. 22, 2018), https://qz.com/1235803/trumps-steel-and-
aluminum-tariffs-which-countries-are-exempt/; see Reuters, Facibox: Tariff Wars -
Duties Imposed by Trump and U.S. Trading Partners,YAIIOO! (May 6,2019),
https://news.yahoo.com/factbox-tariff-wars-duties-imposed-trump-u-trading-
041454019.html; see Alan Rappeport, U.S., Mexico, and Canada Near Deal on Metal
Tariffv, Mnuchin Says, N.Y. TIMES, (May 15, 2019).
[Vol. I4:136
GLOBALIZATION, REVISING THE TERMS OF TRADE
industrial espionage.79  The final report on this investigation was
released on 22 March 201880 with a concomitant Presidential
memorandum,i calling for USTR to draft a "proposed list of
products" for increased tariffs, conduct a notice and comment period
on the same, and "publish a final list of products and tariff
increases."82 That led to additional tariffs imposed on three "lists" of
Chinese goods.
+ List 1. A 25% additional tariff was imposed on a list of tariff
classifications that covered approximately $34 billion in goods
imported from China; this came into effect in early July 2018.83
+ List 2. A 25% additional tariff was imposed on an additional list
of tariff classifications that covered approximately $16 billion in
goods imported from China; this came into effect on 23 August
2018.84
+ List 3. A 10% additional tariff was imposed on an additional list
of tariff classifications that covered approximately $200 billion in
79Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301 Investigation of China's
Laws, Policies, Practices, or Actions Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual
Property, and Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (Mar. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Actions
Related to the Section 301 Investigation].
80 OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT,
FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA'S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES
RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION
UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (2018),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF [hereinafter
Findings of the Section 301 Investigation into China].
8 Actions Related to the Section 301 Investigation, supra note 79, at 13,099.82 Id. at 13,100.
83 United States to Impose Third Set ofSection 301 Tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese-
Made Products, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/pubhcations/client-alerts/2018/09/us-third-
set-tariffs-on-products-from-china [hereinafter Dorsey & Whitney]; see also Request
for Comments Concerning Proposed Modification of Action Pursuant to Section 301:
China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual
Property, and Innovation, 83 FR 33,608 (July 17, 2018) https://ustr.gov/sites/default/
files/301/2018-0026%20China%2OFRN%207-10-2018 0.pdf.84 DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 83.
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goods imported from China and came into effect September
2018.81
Section 301 - 2019 actions
On 10 May 2019, in response to the then-stalled China-US trade talks,
President Trump increased the additional tariffs on the $200 billion
worth of Chinese goods in List 3 from 10% to 25%.86
This list does not include smaller actions which are restricting trade with
China, including the Commerce Department's self-initiated anti-
dumping investigation into Chinese sheet aluminum
8 7 or the same
department's decision to change rules of origin in relation to anti-
dumping orders on solar panels, again hurting Chinese manufacturers.
88
As one would expect, China imposed its own increased tariffs on
85Press Release, USTR Finalizes Tariffs on $200 Billion of Chinese Imports in
Response to China's Unfair Trade Practices, USTR (Sept. 9, 2018)
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2018/september/ustr-finalizes-tariffs-200 (The 10% increase was applied to
"5,745 full or partial lines of the original 6,031 tariff lines that were on a proposed list
of Chinese imports announced on July 10, 2018."); see generally Tariff List Part 1,
Harmonized TarifSchedule ofthe United States, USTR (September 17, 2018),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/TarifPo2OList-
09.17.18.pdf.
1 Don Lee, Chinese Goods Hit with Tariff Increase, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2019, at 1;
David J. Lynch & Damien Paletta, Trump Doubles Tariffs on $200 Billion of Chinese




87 Lori Ann LaRocco, US Launches Anti-Dumping Case Against Chinese Aluminum
Producers Using Rare Aggressive Tactic, CNBC (Nov. 28, 2017, 12:00AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/28/us-launches-antidumping-case-against-chinese-
aluminum-sheet.html. Anti-dumping investigations almost always begin with a
petition from U.S. industry or labor; self-initiated anti-dumping actions are permitted
under the law, but virtually unprecedented.
" Canadian Solar v. United States, 918 F.3d 909, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (upholding
Commerce's use of a new test, rather than the typically used "substantial
transformation" test, to determine the country of origin, finding solar panels
assembled in China came from "China").
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American products imported into China,89 but because of the trade
imbalance-the first level cause of the trade confrontation-retaliatory
tariffs were a limited tool for Beijing.90 As the trade dispute has worn
on, China has moved to other pressure points.91
While the Trump Administration tariffs may disappear-they could
even disappear by the time this article is printed-I believe that the
legacy of this trade dispute in China-US relations will be long-lasting.
To better understand that, let us first consider the trade dispute as an
economic struggle and then, as it is increasingly being understood: as
part of a larger geo-political struggle that is emerging. The great irony
here is that a President who wanted better trade deals from a business
perspective and shorn of geo-politics has triggered a reframing of the
China-U.S. relationship as a geo-political competition no different than
historical relations among great powers.
A. A Multi-Layered Economic Dispute
The Trump administration's confrontation with China is sometimes
presented strictly as an economic dispute. And even the harshest critics
of the administration's approach to China invariably recognize that
China's economic behavior over the past two decades has become
problematic, i.e., that "China notoriously violates the spirit of
89 It did this in tranches to parallel U.S. actions. Cyrille Pluyette, Pikin ripostei
Washington en surtaxant 128produits amiricaines, LE FIGARO (April 2, 2018),
http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2018/04/02/20002-20180402ARTFIGOO104-
pekin-riposte-a-washington-en-surtaxant-128-produits-americains.php; see Jing
Shuiyu & Zhong Nan, China Set to Push back on Latest Levies, CHINA DAILY (UK),
(Sept. 19, 2018), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201809/19/WS5bal3e63a31033b
4f4656cd1.html (tariffs on "about $60 billion worth of imports from the United States
in response to Washington's announcement of additional levies on $200 billion worth
of Chinese goods").
90 Neil rwin, In Trade War, Usual Commerce Rules May Not Apply, N.Y. TIMES,
April 6, 2018, at A6.
' See Bloomberg, China Fines FordandProbes FedEx, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 2019, at
C2 (observers link trade dispute to recent fines and investigations of America
companies in China); see Jason Rogers et al., Rare Earth Metals Are Bargaining Chip
for China, L.A. TIMES, May 30,2019, at C4.
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international trade rules";92 that "there are many complaints that can
justifiably be made about China's use of trade distorting interventions";
93 "that China is a serious disrupter of trade . . . . engages in theft of
intellectual property and ... provides illegal government subsidies that
provide a financial advantage to its state-owned companies";
94 and that
China "engages in a maddening array of tactics that harm U.S. exporters
and investors."95
The July 2018 editorial pages of The Economist provided this
assessment of China's economic behavior:
Since joining the WTO in 2001, China has not turned
toward markets, as the West expected. Instead, it has
distorted trade on a scale that is far bigger than the
dumping and other causes of disputes between market
economies that the WTO was designed to handle....
China's state-owned firms and its vast and opaque
subsidies have distorted markets and caused gluts in
supply in commodities such as steel. Foreign firms
operating in China struggle against heavy-handed
regulations, and are required to hand over their
intellectual property as a condition of market access.96
The Economist judges this to be "Chinese mercantilism"9 7 and, indeed,
the real core of China's economic success has been in playing a
92 Paul Krugman, Trump, Trade and the Advantage ofAutocrats, N.Y. TIMES: OP.
(Feb. 25, 2019) (writing that while the trade conflict with China "is essentially
Trump's personal vendetta .. . there are real reasons for the U.S. to be angry at China,
and demand policy changes. Above all, China notoriously violates the spirit of
international trade rules, de facto restricting foreign companies' access to its market
unless they hand over valuable technology.").
93 Editorial, Trump's irrational trade demands on China, FIN. TIMES, May 8, 2018, at
8 ("There are many complaints that can justifiably be made about China's use of trade
distorting interventions but to be fair to Beijing it does have a reasonably good record
of implementing WTO decisions made against it.").
94 Chow & Sheldon, supra note 53, at 32.
11 Editorial, The Escalating Tariff Face-Off, L.A. TIMES, April 8, 2018, at Al7.
96 A Plan to Save the WTO, TH ECONOMIST, July 21, 2018, at 9.
' Id. Many are now referring to Chinese economic policy as 'mercantilism.' See,
e.g., Letter from Senator Ron Wyden to U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer,
Aug. 2, 2017 (stating that China is competing "through a host of mercantilist
policies") (on file with the author); Greg Ip, China Started the Trade War, Not Trump,
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strategically astute mercantilist giant working a set of trade rules
designed for market economies.
Despite these many descriptions and admissions of China's economic
behavior, there are rarely good prescriptions on how to respond; instead
we usually see vague admonitions to get tough. Of course, 'get tough' is
what the Trump team did, with at least two distinct levels of economic
complaints against Beijing. The first level of complaint has been the
trade deficit with China, plain and simple. At this level, the Trump
administration never or almost never acknowledges the domestic fiscal
policy contributors to chronic U.S. trade deficits (but, in this respect, the
Trump team are not especially different from other American
politicians).
At the second level, the Administration's complaints are the same as
the critics above: that China engages in domestic market manipulation,
theft (or forced transfer) of western technology, vast subsidies, antitrust
and standardization laws that disadvantage non-Chinese, etc. At this
second level, the Administration properly understands these elements as
a robust industrial policy. To its credit, China has an industrial policy
that is thicker and more fulsome than anything the peacetime United
States has ever been capable of. This industrial policy has sometimes
lacked coordination-as with the substantial overbuilding of Chinese
steelmaking capacity-but it certainly has been effective. President
Trump's loud demands for action on the trade deficit-the first level of
complaint-provided the battle cry for Trump's team to take China to
task at this second level.
In 2017 and 2018, Beijing's desire to end the deepening trade
confrontation was expressed clearly in state media and-for one
accustomed to reading communist propaganda-in more subliminal
ways, like the coverage China Daily gave to the "UK and France
end[ing] scallop war" in which "[n]ations agree [to] peaceful resolution
to bitter row." 98  But Beijing's proposals to end the dispute initially
focused on the first level: huge offers to reduce the trade deficit by
purchasing tens of billions of dollars a year in additional goods and
WALL. ST. J. (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-started-the-trade-
war-not-trump-1521797401 (quoting trade expert in the U.S. on Chinese officials'
"mercantilist policies").
98 Jonathan Powell, UK and France End Scallops War, CHINA DAILY (UK), Sept. 19,




services from the United States.99 These proposals were made in good
faith-precisely because Beijing controls a centralized economy. But
they also betrayed a failure to recognize or accept the Trump
Administration's second level of complaints. For example, China
offered to buy "$200 billion of American semiconductors over the next
six years" but "the Chinese proposal would have American semi-
conductor companies move finishing and testing facilities from third
countries like Vietnam and Malaysia into China .. . bolstering Chinese
industry."'"
This semiconductor proposal demonstrates how the harder problems
for negotiators were always going to be the components of China's
robust industrial policy, especially those policies bundled together as
"Made in China 2025."1o Simply put, "many of the Administration's
complaints cut to the core of China's long-term growth strategy"l
0 2
producing the most intractable set of topics'
03 given the parties'
respective objectives. Indeed, because of those objectives, this is where
we may be dealing with a zero-sum game.
Of course, President Xi is right that it is not the United States' place
to "dictate to the Chinese people what should or should not be done"l04
" Nirmal Ghosh, Cautious Optimism ofDeal Emerging as Trade Talks Begin, THE
STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 30, 2019, at A7 (noting "China's pledge to purchase a substantial
amount of goods and services from the United States" and describing this as the
"relatively easy one" of "four broad areas" of negotiation); Ana Swanson & Alan
Rappeport, US. Wrangles Chinafor Firm Commitments as Trade Talks Continue,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/business/
economy/china-us-trade-talks.html ("The offers include large state-directed purchases
of technological goods, natural gas, and soybeans.").
00 Swanson & Rappeport, supra note 99 (John Neuffer, President of the
Semiconductor Industry Association, states that the Chinese proposal "would do little
more than rearrange U.S. supply chains and artificially drive them deeper into
China.").
'01 Markus Brunnermeier, Rush Doshi, & Harold James, Beiing's Bismarckian
Ghosts: How Great Powers Compete Economically, THE WASH. Q., Fall 2018, at 161,
167 (describing "Made in China 2025 initiative" as "a state program that combines
industrial policy with legal and illegal methods of obtaining foreign technology on an
unprecedented scale.").
102 Justin Worland, When the China Trade War Comes Home, TIME MAC,., (Jan. 21,
2019), https://time.com/5498915/china-trade-war-affect/.
103 Ghosh, supra note 99 (noting "the China 2025 vision" as the "most contentious"
component of the China-U.S. negotiations, along with credible enforcement of any
agreement).
'0 Worland, supra note 102.
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for economic development. But Beijing is probably miscalculating if it
believes that it can make these issues go away by dropping the "Made in
China 2025" monikero0 5 and promising to buy more soybeans. If
anything, the Trump administration has caused a crystallization of
awareness among American and European policymakers of how Chinese
industrial policy operates.1 0 6 Businesspeople on both sides of the Pacific
need to accept this new reality.
Of course, there are ways to understand-and present-the trade
dispute as a deep disagreement among equals. It was China who
established a battery of terms and conditions for access to the Chinese
market-terms and conditions that were never anticipated by the WTO
system. One way to view the Trump Administration's approach is that
they are now playing the same card: the terms and conditions for China
to enjoy access to the United States market must be an end of the
burdensome terms and conditions for access to China's market. In his
finer moments, President Trump describes the problem in an even-
handed way, without malice, and simply as a matter of doing business.
B. Trade and the Return ofHistory
But the China-U.S. trade confrontation is not merely about trade and
doing business; it is part of-or may be part of-an emerging geo-
political struggle. That struggle need not and should not become a new
10 Katherine Ross, Document Shows China's Propaganda Scheme in U.S. Trade War,
THE STREET, (July 3, 2018), https://www.thestreet.com/politics/leaked-document-
exposes-china-s-plan-to-go-tit-for-tat-with-u-s--14641079 (Propaganda notice
published in June 3, 2018, China Digital Times warns Chinese media against using
the phrase, 'Made in China 2025.' It threatens that 'there wil be consequences.").
1o6 EU-China -A strategic outlook, supra note 76, at 5-6 (criticizing China for
actions in South China Sea and how "China preserves its domestic markets for its
champions, shielding them from competition through selective market opening,
licensing and other investment restrictions; heavy subsidies to both state-owned and
private sector companies closure of its procurement market; localization requirements,
including for data; the favouring of domestic operators in the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights and other domestic laws; and limiting
access to government-funded programmes for foreign companies"); Theo Sommer,
The European Union is Trying to Forge a More Robust Partnership with China, THE
GERMAN TiMEs, Apr. 2019, at 1 ("in recent years .. . the Europeans have found their
relationship with the People's Republic less and less satisfactory" and reciting the
same issues as US officials).
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'cold war,' although it is sometimes framed in those terms.107 While our
foreign policy establishment understands this geo-political competition,
early in the Trump administration our press and many of our legal and
economic thinkers continued to write about the dispute in the narrow
framework of tariffs, exports, the business community, and the WTO. I
blame this initial disconnect on the intellectual shadow cast by a facially
wrong idea from the 1990s: the so-called "end of history."
The WTO's predecessor, the GATT, debuted at the beginning of the
Cold War with 23 founding members. With the possible (but then
uncertain) exception of Czechoslovakia, all were aligned with the Allies
in WWII and/or linked to the United States or Britain.08  AstheGATT
membership expanded in the 1950s and 1960s, the ideological range of
member states expanded, but the membership continued to be
predominantly countries aligned with the west, neutral countries with
democratic societies, and newly independent former colonies. These
newly independent states had "gained their independence and took over
the rights and obligations of membership that metropolitan powers had
accepted on their behalf." 09 More importantly these new states were
107 See, e.g., Gregory Mitrovich, A New Cold War? Not quite., WASH. POST (March
21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/
2 019/03/21/new-cold-war-not-
quite/?noredirect-on&utmterm=.lbO8ef98eflb (arguing that China is having mixed
results on "soft power" projection as compared to the former Soviet Union and that
"China will remain a competitor for years to come, but there is still a long way for it
to go before the magnitude of its threat reaches that of the Soviet Union, giving both
the Chinese and the Americans the opportunity to chart a different course."); Martin
Wolf, The Challenge Of One World, Two Systems, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2019 ("Should
we conclude that a new 'cold war' has begun? The answer is: yes and no")
[hereinafter Martin, Challenge ofone world]; Jane Perlez, Pence's China Speech Seen
as Portent of 'New Cold War', N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/world/asia/pence-china-speech-cold-war.html.
'0 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 (According to its Preamble, GATT 1947 was the agreement of "[t]he
Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Kingdom of Belgium, the
United States of Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, the Republic of Chile, the Republic
of China, the Republic of Cuba, the Czechoslovak Republic, the French Republic,
India, Lebanon, the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
New Zealand, the Kingdom of Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, the
Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
and the United States of America.").
109 PETER JOHN WILLIAMS, A HANDBOOK ON ACCESSION TO TlE WTO 9-11 (2008).
In the 1950s, new members included the former Axis powers (Germany, Japan, and
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welcomed into the GATT club because the west was competing for their
hearts and minds with the Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union, the People's
Republic of China, most of the rest of the Soviet bloc, and much of the
Arab World remained apart from the GATT-based trading system.
In contrast to the GATT, the WTO was born in the 1990s imbued with
a certain catholicism. According to the WTO's history of itself, "[s]ince
its inception, WTO Members have repeatedly stressed their commitment
to making the WTO universal in scope and coverage."'10
The organization embodied one of the powerful intellectual memes of
that moment: Francis Fukuyama's "the end of history,"'" thenotionthat
we had collectively reached the end point of mankind's ideological
evolution with the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the
final form of human government.112 Even if all states were not yet
representative democracies, there was no serious ideological or
organizational alternative; all we needed to do was keep the peace and
increase globalization until everyone 'harmonized' toward western
ideals. The accession of China to the WTO in 2001 embodied that great,
if implicit, hope: that humanity had ended great power, ideological
struggles; that a set of ideals about human rights, representative
government, and market capitalism would gradually strengthen its grip
on everyone;1 13 and that Pax Americana could elide into a Pax Allianca.
Italy), then allied militarily with the US, as well as Ghana, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Peru,
Sweden, Turkey, and Uruguay. In the 1960s, the membership expanded to include
Austria, Argentina, Barbados, Cyprus, Iceland, South Korea, Poland, Switzerland, and
many newly independent African countries (Benin, Burundi, Cameroun, Central
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, and Uganda.); For a list of accession
dates to the GATT, see The 128 countries that had signed GAT by 1994, WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/gattmem e.htm.
110 WILLIAMS, supra note 109.
I FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
112 Francis Fukuyama, The End ofHistory?, 16 THE NAT'L INT. 3, 4 (1989).
1" Pence, Hudson Institute Speech, supra note 62 ("After the fall of the Soviet Union,
we assumed that a free China was inevitable. Heady with optimism, at the turn of the
21s Century, America agreed to give Beijing open access to our economy, and bring
China into the World Trade Organization"); Rodrik, supra note 40 ("An important
element of hyper-globalist triumphalism was the belief that countries with different
economic and social models would ultimately converge, if not on identical models, at
least on sufficiently similar market economy models. China's admission to the WTO,
in particular, was predicated on the expectation in the West that the state would give
up directing economic activity.").
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Since 2001, China has unquestionably gone through periods where
economic reform moved toward a market economy, but the 2008 global
financial crisis helped convince many in Beijing that they could improve
on western market orthodoxies. Meanwhile, increasing wealth meant
increasing power. And, as Aaron Freidberg notes, "fast-rising states
have historically tended to seek regional, if not global, hegemony,
pursuits that have often brought them into conflict with the dominant
powers of their day."' 4 China under Xi Jinping behaves predictably for
those who knew that history does not end. Russia's leadership also
seems not to have gotten the memo/meme about history being finished.
Counting China, a militant Russia, and a persistent Iran as the main
competitors to Pax Americana, Michael Mandelbaum observes that
"[n]ow, as before, the revisionist powers are dictatorships that challenge
American values as well as American interests." 
Is
In the foreign policy establishment (as distinct from the international
trade crowd), there is a keen awareness of China as both economic
partner and geopolitical competitor. By mid-2019, that framework
seemed to be seeping into the American mainstream.16 Chinese
commentators also clearly understand the issues in broader terms,
sometimes framing the problem as one of "coexistence" for "the
established power and the rising power," the problem of two "rising"
powers together,' 17 or that Americans must respect China by
"recognizing its natural sphere of influence.""' This frame of reference
is so strong that Chinese thinkers - from Xi Jinping down - have
downplayed the dangers of China and the United States falling into a
114 Aaron Friedberg, The Signs Were There in Did America Gel China Wrong? - The
Engagement Debate, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2018, at 183.
'" Michael Mandelbaum, The New Containment - Handling Russia, China, and Iran,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2019, at 123.
116 See, e.g., Don Lee, For the U.S. and China, it's not a trade war anymore - it's
Something Worse, L.A. TIMEs, June 2, 2019.
"' Wang Jisi, The Viewfrom China in DidAmerica Get China Wrong? - The
Engagement Debate, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 2018 ("In reality, compared with
most other countries in the world, both China and the United States are rising
powers.").
'" Eric Li, Better Together, in Did America Get China Wrong? - The Engagement
Debate, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2018 ("If the United States treats China, and indeed
also Russia, with the respect that such a great power deserves by recognizing its
natural sphere of influence, it will have a chance to remain the world's most powerful
country for a long time.").
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"Thucydides trap" that is, new and established economic powers with
different ideologies going to war with one another.
Of course, recognition of China as a "rising power" begs more
questions than it answers. Does China want to replace the United States
as the preeminent superpower? Or does China just want dominance in
East Asia and the western Pacific? 119 Will China's rise arrest global
progress on human rights and representative democracy? And while the
command structure in China is highly centralized,120 anyone who thinks
that there is a single "China" to answer any of these questions does not
appreciate the diversity of thinking among China's sophisticated elites.
In all this, we must keep in mind that competition between the U.S.
and China is very different from the competition between the U.S. and
the Soviet Union, 1947-1992. On the bright side, whatever China's
motives - and those motives may change with different leaders -
China is not "a single mortal threat ... committed to remaking the entire
world in its own image." Because of its Marxist ideology, the Soviet
Union treated foreign policy as somewhere between a relationship
among sovereign states and an international civil war.121 Ideologically,
Xi Jinping's worldview is mainly a nullification of western values, i.e.
that a wealthy, stable future can be constructed on a distinctly Chinese
foundation that does not need individual civil rights or representative
democracy as central pillars. If China has any cohering ideology now, it
is nationalism - and that China must be recognized by others as the
"middle kingdom," that is, at the center of the globe. That is neither an
"' Oriano Skylar Mastro, The Stealth Superpower: How China Hid Its Global
Ambitions, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2019, at 31 ("In the Indo-Pacific region, China
wants complete dominance; it wants to force the United States out and become the
region's unchallenged political, economic, and military hegemon.").
120 So much so that a reputable media source can still refer to a single "propaganda
department" for China. See, e.g., Sui-Lee Wee & Li Yuan, China Censors Bad
Economic NewsAmid Signs ofSlower Growth, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018 /09/28/business/china-censor-economic-news.html
("China's propaganda department couldn't be reached late Friday for comment.").
121 HENRY KISSINGER, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 122 (3rd ed. 1977) (noting that by
the late 1970s the "Soviet Union ha[d] begun to practice foreign policy-at least
partially-as a relationship among states rather than an international civil war.").
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ideology that exports nor one that endears a country with other nations
or peoples.12 2
But while China does not have an ideological mission on par with 2 0th
century Marxism, it does have two things Americans sorely need to
remember. First, China does offer an alternative social and economic
organization, one increasingly bent on surveillance and
micromanagement of its citizenry;123 that approach to governance will
appeal to some leaders in some countries. Second, China has a difficult
lineage in foreign affairs, with a history of being regionally dominant and
then quickly humbled by western Europeans. The specter of "unequal
treaties" and a "Century of Humiliation" beginning with the Opium Wars
weighs heavily on Chinese thinkers. And that goes both ways. As Henry
Kissinger observed in the 1970s,
A strong China has historically tended to establish
suzerainty over its neighbors; in fact, one special
problem of dealing with China - Communism apart -
is that it has had no experience in conducting foreign
policy with equals. China has either been dominant or
subjected.124
122 Mastro, supra note 119, at 39 (China's "leaders have failed to articulate a vision of
global dominance that is beneficial for any country but China"); Wolf, supra note 107
("China is not exporting a global ideology, but behaving as a normal great power.").
123 Elizabeth Economy, The Problem with Xi's China Model, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar. 6,
2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-03-06/problem-xis-china-
model ("As many as 200 million surveillance cameras have already been installed in
an effort to reduce crime and control social unrest. The surveillance technology will
also play an essential role in the 2020 national rollout of the country's social credit
system, which will evaluate people's political and economic trustworthiness and
reward and punish them accordingly."); Sui-Lee Wee, China Uses DNA to Track Its
People, With the help ofAmerican Expertise, N.Y.TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/business/china-xinjiang-uighur-dna-thermo-
fisher.html (36 million people, principally Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang, participated
in program to collect DNA samples, images of irises, and other personal data).
124 KISSINGER, supra note 122, at 91. Perhaps decades of interaction with other
Communist regimes 1950-1992 produced a better sense of equal foreign nations, but
Kissinger's comment resonates with a 1919 observation by Lu Xun that the Chinese
historically viewed foreigners as "either 'beasts' or 'royal highnesses.' They have
never been called friends, nor said to have anything in common with us." Lu XuN,
Impromptu Reflections No. 48, JOTTINGS UNDER LAMPLIGT 253, 253 (Eileen J.
Cheng & Kirk A. Denton eds., 2017).
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American policy makers need to be sensitive to this frame of reference
on the Chinese side. When Chinese negotiators repeatedly urge the
United States to meet them "halfway"l 25 or on "even ground,"l26 this
reflects their desire (and need) to establish a deal between equals.
On the other hand, the Chinese need to understand that the litany of
unkept commitments by China makes the "meet half-way" offer sound,
to westerners, like more of the same. Indeed, by 2019, one of the
recurring themes among commentators is how Beijing makes the same
promises over and over - and does not abide by those commitments.
Perhaps this is the great divide in the mindset of the two negotiating
teams.127 The Trump Administration insists that there be mechanisms to
determine Chinese compliance with any agreement.128  From the
American perspective, 20-40 years of unkept Chinese promises makes
this insistence justified. But for the Chinese side, compliance
125 Zhao Huanxin, Wang Yi: Meet China 'Halfway'on Trade Issues, CHINA DAILY,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201806/15/WS5b23d7e4a31001Of8f59d3fa.html (last
updated June 15, 2018) (statement from Foreign Minister Wang Yi) ("We hope the
US side can meet China halfway ... ."); Zhao Huanxin & Jing Shuiyu, China
'Sincere'on Trade Talks, CHINA DAILY,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201905/10/WS5cd4aad9a3104842260bad34.html
(last updated May 10, 2019) (quoting Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang);
David J. Lynch & Damien Paletta, Trump Doubles Tarifs on $200 Billion of Chinese
Imports, Escalating US.-China Trade War, WASH. POST (May 10, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ahead-of-us-china-trade-talks-xi-
writes-to-trump/2019/05/09/4adb6fl-727f-1e9-9eb4-0828f5389013_story.html
(statement from Chinese spokesman) ("We hope that the U.S. and China will meet
each other halfway and make joint efforts to solve the existing problems through
cooperation and consultation").
126 Robyn Dixon, Wary China Set to Talk Trade with U.S., L.A. TIMES, June 20,
2019, 2018, at Cl, C5 (statement from Xi Jingping ) ("[a]ny deal would have to be
reached 'through dialogue on even ground. . . ."').
127 This conceptual divide has been noted by others. See, e.g., David J. Lynch, With
One Eye on the Past, Trump andXi: Look to the Future of U.S.-China Trade, WASH.
POST (May 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/with-one-
eye-on-the-past-trump-and-xi-look-to-the-future-of-us-china
trade/2019/05/08/6clc232a-71d7-11e9-9f6-5fc2ee80027a story.html (noting that the
"Trump administration looks at the past 20 years of agreements with China as an
unbroken record of cheating and broken promises" while history of "unequal treaties"
makes "Beijing reluctant to accept terms that might be seen at home as foreign
dictates").
128 Martin Wolf, The Chinese Economy is Stabilizing, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/37ac5fD8-5529-11e9-91f9-b6515a54c5b1 ("[T]he US
seems determined to monitor Chinese behavior, with the intention of imposing
penalties (that is, tariffs) whenever China is judged to be backsliding.").
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mechanisms risk creating the appearance of foreign meddling in Chinese
internal affairs and the unequal treaties of old.
And unlike competition with Russia or Iran, China-U.S. competition
has a simple, hard nugget problem at its core. In our past peaceful geo-
political and ideological struggle with the Soviet Union, economic
relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were minimal.1
29 So the
problem for both sides in the China-US equation is: how does one
manage a long-term, but potentially intense geo-political competition
with an economy with which one has become substantially intertwined?
One obvious way to manage the relationship is to diminish some of
the economic interdependence. That has started to happen and the
longer the trade dispute between China and the US continues/d-and the
more President Trump made it the subject of intermittent blow-ups and
reversals-the more investors will move their productive assets out of
China.130
In late 2018, a UBS survey of chief financial officers at export-
oriented manufacturers in China "found that a third had moved at least
some production out of China in 2018" and "[a]nother third" intended to
do so in 2019.'3 In a short amount of time, some production has shifted
from mainland China to India, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand,
129 Mandelbaum, supra note 115 (noting "the Soviet Union was largely detached from
the U.S.-centered global economy during the Cold War ... but China has the world's
second-largest economy, with deep, wide, and growing connections to countries
everywhere.").
130 Keith Bradsher, One Trump Victory: Companies Rethink China, N.Y.TIMES (Apr.
5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/business/china-trade-trump-jobs-
decoupling.html; Economy, supra note 123 ("[T]he U.S. government's enforcement
of tariffs on $250 billion in Chinese exports to the United States has... caused some
multinational corporations to shift or consider shifting manufacturing out of China to
other countries."); Charlene Barshefsky, Vietnam Should Repeal New Law Choking
Cross-Border Data Flows, TE STRAITS TIMES (Jan. 30, 2019),
https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/vietnam-should-repeal-new-law-choking-cross-
border-data-flows (Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand "stand to gain from the on-
going US-China trade tensions, as global companies seek to diversify away from
China while retaining a presence in the region.").
' Bradsher, supra note 130; see also Don Lee, Tarifs are Causing Damage to More
U.S. Businesses, L.A. TIMES, September 13, 2018, at Al, A8 (Chicago-based
"Reshoring Initiative") (finding 16 "companies moving jobs or investment back to the
U.S. at least in part because of the threat of tariffs."). Continued uncertainty continues
the trend. See James F. Peltz, Bracingfor Tariffs on Everyday Items, L.A. TIMES, May
19, 2019, at Cl, C7 (retailers are "trying to find alternative manufacturers in other
countries").
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Taiwan, and the United States for a range of products that includes
steel,132 aluminum, air conditioner parts,133 auto parts,13 4 LED light
bulbs,135 smartphones,'36 toys,13 7 shoes,'38 poster board, paper products,
knitted and crocheted fabrics, silk yarn, and garlic cloves.139 One should
emphasize this is some production and that some shift was underway
prior to 2017 because of rising wages for Chinese workers. But the
narrative has shifted from how intertwined the China-U.S. supply chains
132 Ralph Jennings, Vietnam Booming, Aided by OldFoe, L.A. TIMES, January 3,
2019, at A3 (shifting steel production).
i3 Matthew Townsend & Eric Martin, Mexico is a Clear Winner in the U.S.-China
Trade War, L.A. TIMES, March 28, 2019, at Cl, C1 (aluminum, air conditioner parts,
poster board, paper products, knitted and crocheted fabrics, silk yam, and garlic
cloves).
134 Bradsher, supra note 130 ("Some auto part companies have run their American
factories more hours each day to avoid tariffs on Chinese-made goods. . . ."); Ana
Swanson, Trump's Trade War With China Pierces the Heart ofMichigan, N.Y. TIMES
(July 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/us/politics/trade-war-china-
michigan.html (statement of expert) ("[T]he tariffs are actually encouraging some
Chinese companies to move their operations to the United States, especially if they
are seeking to supply the American market.").
13 Neil Irwin, Alexandra Stevenson & Claire Ballentine, Trade War may Evolve in
Complex Patterns, N.Y. TIMES [INT'L EDITION] (June 25, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/upshot/what-a-trade-war-with-china-looks-like-
on-the-front-lines.html (describing how Malaysia will compete better to supply LED
light bulbs).
' 6 Bradsher, supra note 130 (reporting "Sony's closure of a Beijing smartphone
factory last month after expanding production in Thailand"); The Technology Industry
is Rife with Bottlenecks, THE ECONOMIST: PINCH POINTs, June 8, 2019, at 58, 59
("Samsung has already moved most of its smartphone production to Vietnam .... ")
David Pierson & Sam Dean, Trump's Huawei ban could upend global tech industry,
L.A. TIMES, May 23, 2019, at Cl, C4 ("Foxconn has been reported to be considering
opening an iPhone facility in Vietnam in order to sidestep a trade war.").
13 Bradsher, supra note 130 ("Hasbro, the world's leading toymaker, has a goal ...
'to be 60 percent out of China"' by the end of 2020. "Hasbro is moving its toy making
to the United States, Mexico, Vietnam and India.").
"' Id. ("Steve Madden, the shoe company, is moving production to Cambodia.").
139 Townsend & Martin, supra note 133 (mentioning those products); Sophia
Kunthara, The Market Thinks the Trade War Stinks. A California Garlic Grower
Disagrees, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON. (May 19, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
business/article/The-markets-think-the-trade-war-stinks-A-13857789.php (major U.S.
garlic producer returning to production levels before surge in Chinese imports).
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are to how quickly they seem to be decoupling.1
40 Even China Daily
recognizes this is happening.141 Indeed, 2+ years of higher tariffs and
tariff uncertainties is pushing even Chinese companies to move some
production out of mainland China.'
42
In a new collaborative-competitive relationship, Americans are likely
to remain keenly aware of- or no longer politely ignore - the fact that
'commitments' by Chinese counterparts are not commitments as
westerners have historically understood them. This includes an
increasing awareness among western policymakers that deals with China
have too often left more "wiggle room" than an average deal - space
for defying the spirit, if not the letter, of an agreement.143  Indeed,
Americans are partially to blame for this, launching the modern era of
US-China relations with the "creative ambiguity" of the 1972 Shanghai
140 Tim Culpan, iPhone is Made in China- and in US., Europe, Taiwan, L.A. TIMES,
June 13, 2019, at C2 (concluding "[i]t wouldn't take much for Apple Inc. to have US-
sold iPhones made outside China."); THE ECONOMIST: PINCH POINTS, supra note 136
("Many firms will speed up efforts to bypass China - for instance by building
factories in places like India or Mexico."); Bullyfor You, THE ECONOMIST, June 8,
2019, at 65 (stating that "[t]ariffs certainly seem to be spooking some into avoiding
China" and that "companies are increasingly sourcing from elsewhere, and
'localizing"').
141 Zhao Huanxin, Tariffs Will Raise Prices and Ruin Companies, Hearings Are Told,
CHINA DAILY, June 24, 2019, at 1, 2 (quoting from a New Balance official) ("We
have undertaken significant effort to redirect sourcing to non-Chinese suppliers
wherever possible, but these supply chains take a minimum of 18 months to redirect
and in some cases cannot be fully recreated outside China .. ).
142 Emily Feng, Beijing Shifts Steel Production Overseas as It Reduces Exports, FIN.
TIMES (June 24, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/dfal22b
8-6 f 9 5 -1 le8-92d3-
6cl3e5c92914 (describing movement of Chinese steel plants to southeast Asia,
reduction of Chinese steel capacity at home, and concluding "analysts say the biggest
factor behind Chinese producers looking abroad is the desire to directly produce and
sell in fast-growing markets and avoid US tariffs"); Jennings, supra note 132
(documenting Chinese investment in Vietnam "largely to escape the trade war with
the U.S.").
143 Julie Hirschfeld Davis & David E. Sanger, Obama andXiJinping of China Agree
to Steps on Cybertheft, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
09/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-white-house.html ("Even the agreement on cybersecurity
left room for differences ... while Mr. Obama said they had agreed on 'the principle
that governments don't engage in cyberespionage for commercial gain against
companies,' Mr. Xi said nothing of computer-enabled spying, speaking only of
'cybercrime,' a narrower formulation.").
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communique and accepting questionable or loose translations from
English to Chinese. 1
If this is correct, going forward, American and other western
negotiators are likely to insist on verifiable, measurable benchmarks of
compliance. And Chinese negotiators may be understandably resistant
to quantification of measures for deal-compliance, not only because this
seems to intrude in domestic affairs but perhaps because vague
commitments are more compatible with with traditional Chinese
thinking.145 This appears to be what happened when China and the U.S.
seemed close to a trade deal in early May 2019: the Chinese expected
their commitments could be vague and when they understood that the
Trump team wanted very specific commitments on laws to be repealed,
laws to be amended, and actions to be stopped, Beijing walked back some
of those offers.146
Far more corrosive of future agreements is the increased awareness in
the United States and Europe that Beijing often simply does not keep to
the bargains it strikes. While western countries might have a fairly strict
idea of pacta sunt servanda,147 Beijing seems to have - and wants to
preserve - a more exculpatory understanding of clausula rebus sic
stantibus, i.e. that commitments can be avoided when there is a change
in circumstances.
' See Neil Thomas, When It Comes to Negotiating with China, the Devil is in the
Details, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/
2019/0 3/2 6/when-it-comes-negotiating-with-china-devil-is-details/?noredirect-
on&utm term=.e89af0ecb318.
145 See, e.g., LIN YUTANG, MY COUNTRY AND MY PEOPLE (1936) (especially
Chapters 3 & 4). Of course, China's recent substantial accomplishments in science
and technology, e.g. its space program, show a society quite capable of precise
quantitative thinking.
146 Ana Swanson & Keith Bradsher, Trump Advisers Accuse China ofReneging on
Trade Commitments, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
05/06/us/politics/trump-tariffs-china.html (stating that USTR returned from trade
negotiation "dismayed by China's refusal to mention commitments it had made to
update various Chinese laws in the final text of the trade agreement").
147 Arguably the oldest principle of international law, "pacta sunt servanda" is
enshrined in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (1969)
("Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by
them in good faith."). See generally Hans Wehberg, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 53 AM. J.
INT'L L. 775 (1959); Manfred Lachs, Pacta Sunt Servanda, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUB. INT'L L. 364 (1984).
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Along these lines, there are multiple lessons to be drawn from Obama
and Xi Jinping's 2015 "common understanding" that neither the United
States nor China should engage in state-sponsored cyberintrusions to
poach intellectual property. . .,"14 In the case of the Xi-Obama
agreement, while U.S. cybersecurity firms "concluded that cyber
intrusions against U.S. firms by Chinese state-sponsored and supported
hackers since September 2015 have decreased or become more difficult
to detect, none has concluded that the activity has ceased entirely."'
49 In
other words, there was some honoring of the commitment. But equally
important, in the decline in cyberintrusions was followed by a dramatic
uptick in Chinese cyberattacks on American companies following Trump
trade demands on China, causing U.S. intelligence officials to conclude
that "the 2015 agreement appears to have been unofficially canceled
amid the continuing trade tensions between the United States and China
"150
And sometimes China decides not to fulfill its commitments, even
without substantial change in circumstances. The 2012 U.S.-China Film
Agreement is an example of a bilateral commitment by China that has
remained unfulfilled, although changing circumstances would make it
easier for China to meet its commitments under the 
agreement.15' A
broader example is China's unfulfilled commitments to open its financial
services sector.152
148 Davis & Sanger, supra note 143.
149 Findings of the Section 301 Investigation into China, supra note 80, at 169.
150 Nicole Perlroth, Chinese and Iranian Hackers Renew Their Attacks on U.S.
Companies, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/201
9 /02 /18/
technology/hackers-chinese-iran-usa.html. And a reasonable person could assume
that the American government engages in substantial cybersurveillance and espionage
against the Chinese government, if not its companies. See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth,
David E. Sanger & Scott Shane, How Chinese spies got the N.S.A.'s Hacking Tools,
and Used Them for Attacks, N.Y. TIMEs (May 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/05/06/us/politics/china-hacking-cyber.html.
151 See Independent Film and Television Alliance, Letter from Independent Film and






152 In its 2001 WTO accession commitments, China agreed that by December 2006
"foreign financial institutions will be permitted to provide services to all Chinese
clients" in RMB and foreign currency; in 2012, the WTO found that China had still
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The Trump team has a keen awareness of all this,153 an awareness that
is taking hold in DC policy circles-and probably in European capitals
as well. Perhaps this will mean that the United States and China are less
able to enter into any agreements beyond what is absolutely needed.
Perhaps it will mean that comprehensive agreements are less doable than
deals on narrowly drawn, specific issues.
IV. WHAT THIS LKELY MEANS FOR THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY
What does all this mean for the business community in the United
States? On the general ledger, the international policy of the Trump
Administration has been much more consistent with post-WWII
American policies than headlines and presidential tweets suggest. Still
the international business environment has changed-significantly. And
there are good reasons to think much of the change will survive Donald
Trump's passing through the swamp of Washington.
On trade relations generally, the revision of NAFTA (the USMCA)
may or may not prove acceptable to Congress. But even if it is rejected
in its present form, my guess is that any revision of the terms of trade
among the North American economies will be likely to emphasize
enhanced industrial production within the NAFTA zone as well as
improvements in environmental and labor standards. Similarly, if the
Trump Administration's quieter negotiations with Japan and the EU
produce any results, the changes are likely to strengthen industrial
not fulfilled key commitments to open financial services. See World Trade
Organization, Panel Report, China-Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment
Services, DS413 (2012), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE Search/FE_S
S006.aspx?Query=(@Symbol=%20wt/ds413/r*%20not%2Orw*)&Language=ENGLI
SH&Context-FomerScriptedSearch&languageUlChanged-true#. New Chinese
banking regulations in 2017 made it clear that compliance in opening its market is still
years away. See Doug Palmer, China drags itsfeet on opening market to electronic
payments like Visa and MasterCard, POLITICO (July 7, 2017), https://www.politico.
com/story/2017/07/12/china-drags-feet-on-key-100-day-plan-commitment-240455.
Maintaining a closed market allowed Chinese companies, especially Alipay and
Tencent, to grow into global players.
153 See, e.g., Bob Davis, The Man Behind Trump's China Fight, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7-
8, 2018, at Al ("'China is tap, tap, tapping us along,' [USTR Lighthizer said],
meaning it regularly promised policy changes but didn't deliver."); Swanson &
Rappeport, supra note 99 ("American officials are increasingly focused on ensuring
that China, which has often reneged on promises to past administrations, actually
adheres to any agreement.").
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production among developed countries; give increasing recognition to
wage, labor, and environmental standards; and involve a rebalancing of
interests among the heavily subsidized and quirky agricultural markets
of developed countries. In all this, we might consider one Chinese
analyst's concern in 2018 over "the possible emergence of a zero-tariff
club of select developed nations." 54  While a zero-tariff club is not
likely, it is possible that future trade 'liberalization' will take the form of
deals among similar economies-more like the initial GATT-and less
like the global, multilateral system we grew accustomed to after 1994.
For China, it is very possible that Beijing will make many of the
structural reforms advocated by the Trump administration, with or
without a comprehensive trade deal. For example, China's new Foreign
Investment Law is slated to come into effect on January 1, 2020, allowing
foreigners to own businesses and capital assets in China on something
closer to conditions in developed economies.'s Reform efforts in
Beijing have always had to avoid the appearance of China acceding to
foreigners' demands; a reliable way to do this is to present the reform as
something China wants or should want, whether it is improved
enforcement of intellectual property'56 or loosened restrictions on
foreign investments. On this count,failure to get a comprehensive trade
deal with the United States may not jinx structural reforms in the Chinese
economy-indeed, it might make them easier.57 Other reforms may
continue, including in response to pressure at the WTO (an agreed
multilateral forum versus unilateral American demands). For example,
Dan Prud'homme and Max von Zedtwitz believe that "the rapidness of
the changes" circa 2018-2019 in Chinese laws implicated in forced
154 Wang Huiyao, The Multilateral Trade System Must be Protected, CHINA DAILY
(UK Weekend), Sept. 21-23, 2018, at 7 (suggesting that US deals with "developed
countries" point in that direction).
I Mark Schaub, Openfor Business, CIINA DAILY: GLOBAL ED., May 10, 2019, at
13 (the new Foreign Investment Law "will allow existing joint ventures to be
restructured to models that better allow for the majority shareholder to make decisions
subject to some caveats").
I Id. (China "has placed great emphasis-as much for its internal development as for
placate overseas rights holders-on improving and enforcing the rights of intellectual
property holders").
' For a discussion of how Chinese domestic reform may continue in some
investment, intellectual property, and technology areas, see Mark Cohen, Unpacking
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technology transfer "appear to be in response to the WTO complaints
lodged against China by the US, EU, and other nations."158
In the medium-term, it is also reasonable to expect that American and
European officials will continue to ratchet up their scrutiny of Chinese
investments. Indeed, the high-profile debate over Huawei15 9 actually
masks the more structural changes that are taking place. In 2018,
Congress expanded the authority of the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to review foreign investments
into the United States; the changes in the law were intended to address
growing national security concerns over Chinese exploitation of certain
investment which traditionally have fallen outside of CFIUS
jurisdiction. 160 Some of the jurisdictional expansion sounded Cold War-
like,1 6 1 while other aspects of the expansion seem focused on Chinese
acquisition of American technology and know-how.16 2 There were over
a dozen Chinese acquisitions nixed by North American regulators in
2018.163 CFRUS has also opposed ownership deals that would potentially
give Beijing access to substantial information about American citizens.
Thus, the Committee opposed Chinese acquisition or ownership of
Moneygram International [used by lower income citizens, especially
i1 Dan Prud'homme & Max von Zedtwitz, Managing 'Forced' Technology Transfer
in Emerging Markets: The Case of China, 25 J. INT'L MGMT. 3, 2019, at 10.
19 See, e.g., Susan Decker, FCC ChiefResists China Mobile's Bid to Serve U.S., L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 18, 2019); Don Lee, Trump Order Takes Aim at Huawei, L.A. TIMES
(May 16, 2019), (President issued executive order giving administration officials
"sweeping powers" to block Chinese telecom giant Huawei from doing business in
the United States); Daniel Leisegang, Listen Up, THE GERMAN TIMES (Apr. 2019),
http://www.german-times.com/listen-up-huawei-5g-and-the-new-geopolitics/ ("The
United States government is currently doing all it can to prevent Huawei's growing
influence. It is demanding that its allies cease awarding contracts to the company.")
1" The amendment of CFIUS jurisdiction came in the "Foreign Investment Risk
Review Modernization Act of 2018." See Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act of 2018 § 1719(b).
161Summary of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, U.S.
Treasury Department, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/
Documents/Summary-of-FIRRMA.pdf (CFIS jurisdiction expanded to any
"purchase, lease, or concession by or to a foreign person of real estate located in
proximity to sensitive government facilities.").
16 2 Id. (CFIUS jurisdiction expanded to investments "in certain U.S. businesses that
afford a foreign person access to material nonpublic technical information in the
possession of the U.S. business.").
163 Id
2020] 57
OHIO STATE BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
enlisted troops, to transfer funds]'" and ordered divestiture of Grindr [a
same-sex dating service].1 65
The 2018 legislation also extended the CFIUS review period from 30
days to 45 days-with the possibility of a 15-day extension.1
66 For the
American business community, this means that being acquired by a
Chinese company will be a slower, more tenuous process. All other
things being equal, that inevitably makes Chinese investors less
attractive.167 The European Union is also revising its foreign direct
investment review process-again, with China in mind.168 According to
Martin Wolf, the EU is following the United States in "getting more
hawkish on China's trade and investment practices."169
In all this, western officials and business people are now more likely
to think of Chinese companies as representing the Chinese state-better
appreciating the blurred lines in China between private and public,
" MoneyGram and Ant Financial Announce Termination ofAmended Merger
Agreement, Moneygram (Jan. 2, 2018), http://ir.moneygram.com/news-releases/news-
release-details/moneygram-and-ant-financial-announce-termination-amended-merger
(companies "mutually agreed to terminate their Amended Merger Agreement
following the inability of the companies to obtain the required approval for the
transaction from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States").
' Paul Marquardt, John P. McGill, Jr. & Chinyelu Lee, CFIUS Forces Kunlun to
Unwind 2016 Acquisition ofGrindr Over Concerns About the Protection ofSensitive




data ("In the case ofGrindr, CFIUS may have been specifically concerned about the
data of military and intelligence personnel, or other persons with access to
information of potential interest to foreign intelligence agencies and potentially
vulnerable to blackmail.").
166 Id.
161 See, e.g., Kate O'Keefe, Chinese Deals Lose Lusterfor Officials Across U.S.,
WALL ST. J., July 26, 2019.
6M The Chinese are certainly aware of how increased scrutiny of investments in
western economies is disadvantageous to them. See, e.g., Chen Weihua, EU's New
FDI Screening Should Not Should not Target China, CINA DAILY (Global Edition)
(Mar. 8, 2019) (discussing new screening framework for foreign direct investments
(FDI) in the EU and noting that "[w]hile the framework does not publicly claim to
target Chinese FDI, concern over growing Chinese FDI coming into the EU has been
widely viewed as a major reason for the legislation").
' Martin Wolf, Opinion, The Chinese Economy is Stabilizing, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 2,
2019). Wolf also believes "[a] return to the relations of a few years ago is unlikely."
Id.
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including a widespread belief that China has government intelligence
officers throughout China's private high technology firms. 17 0
At the same time that it revised the law governing review of foreign
investments, Congress also updated export controls on U.S. technologies
with the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA). The ECRA mandates an
inter-agency effort to identify "emerging and foundational" technologies
"essential" to national security, then add those technologies to our export
control system. If "emerging," "foundational" and "essential" were not
sufficiently vague concepts, "technology" has a broad meaning in the
law, including know-how and research and development results.171 I
November 2018, the Commerce Department began a notice and
comment period as it works toward development of a revised export
control list. Artificial intelligence software and supporting hardware is
just one of the central points of debate in shaping new technology export
controls.172
While this effort is all couched in neutral terms, there is no question
that it is meant to "prevent China from getting access to vital new US
technologies"l7 3 and, as of the summer of 2019, the U.S. Commerce
Department had separately cut off technology exports to Chinese
no Norman Pearlstine et al., Who's BehindHuawei?, L.A. TIMES, April 14, 2019, at
Al, A9 ("Interviews with Huawei employees and companies doing business with it
reveal a widespread belief that the Chinese government has placed intelligence agents
in Huawei officers around the world and that conversations are routinely
monitored.").
"1 The ECRA defines "technology" to include "(i) information necessary for the
development, production, use, operation, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul or
refurbishing of an item; and (ii) information at whatever stage of its creation, such as
foundational information and know-how," subject to further specification in
regulation. Export Control Reform Act of 2018, H.R.5040, 115th Cong. (2018); see
also Martin Chorzempa, The Trump Administration's Rush to Curb Technology
Leakage Is in Danger ofBackfiring, PETERSON INST. OF INT'L ECON: TRADE AND
INVESTMENT POLICY WATCH. (Jan. 8, 2019), https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-
policy-watch/trump-administrations-rush-curb-technology-leakage-danger.
172 See, e.g., Letter from the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) at
Georgetown Univ. to Matthew S. Borman, Deputy Assistant Sec'y of Commerce for
Export Controls (Jan. 10, 2019), (on file with author), https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019-01-10-Dept-of-Commerce-GU-CSET-ANPRM-on-Export-
Controls-for-AI.pdf (recommending controls on "equipment for manufacturing Al
chips" but against controls on software).
173 Chorzempa, supra note 171.
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supercomputer developers.17 4 Because of the way ECRA defines
"export," the law may now raise legitimate questions about having
Chinese national scientists working in U.S. research and development
facilities.175 While the potential negative impact - on both research
and the lives of individuals - is a real concern, revised technology
export controls on the American side are a reasonable response to forced
technology-transfers on the Chinese side. Companies have a variety of
potential responses to demands from a host country for technology
transfer,17 6 but export controls allow the American businessperson to say
"no, I can't share that technology with you without risking federal
prison." So, we can expect that the American business community will
publicly express concern over re-invigorated export controls, while many
western companies will quietly use the rules pro-actively. Again, this
may just mean less business - because the two (equal) sides cannot
agree on the terms of trade.
Are we seeing an overreaction against China? Some in the
international business community will feel that way. Given what we
know and do not know, U.S. and EU efforts to block strategic Chinese
investments, rearrange supply chains to avoid compromise, and limit
exports of technology might be an inadvertent application of what the
Europeans would call the "precautionary principle." The "precautionary
principle" is an idea widely discussed in environmental and health
regulation. Originating in German law ("Vorsorgeprinzip"), the basic
idea is that in the case ofpotentially serious or irreversible effects, there
may be a needto act to reduce potential risks before there is strongproof
taking into account he likely costs and benefits ofaction versus inaction.
The United States has not been an advocate of the precautionary principle
in the past, but that approach may become the defacto framework on the
American side for much of the China-US economic relationship,
especially given all the unknowns about what is actually happening in
China.
" Kate O'Keeffe and Asa Fitch, U.S. Targets China's Supercomputing Push with
New Export Restrictions, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2019.
1' Id.
176 Prud'homme & Zedtwitz, supra note 158 (describing several techniques
multinational corporations use); Dan Prud'homme, Max von Zedtwitz, Joachim Jan
Thraen & Martin Bader, Forced Technology Transfer Policies: Workings in China
and Strategic Implications, 134 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & Soc. CHANGE 150
(2018) (analyzing ways China and other countries promote technology transfer and
foreign companies resist).
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V. CONCLUSION
In his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump made broadside
attacks against how the U.S. had handled international trade. As soon as
the Trump administration made it clear that Trump's campaign rhetoric
would be put into action, we saw both major press outlets and otherwise
responsible scholars countering with a defense of free trade that was
equally reductionist. As it became clear that Trump was willing-and
able-to do revised trade deals (revised KORUS, USMCA), the panic
subsided while the distaste for the president's techniques remained.
In the Wealth ofNations, Adam Smith arguably gave us a framework
for the Trump trade agenda and its 2017-2018 critics. An embodiment
of free trade thinking, Smith nonetheless believed that a cost/benefit
analysis should be applied to the question of punitive tariffs:
[T]here may be good policy in retaliations .. . when
there is a probability that they will procure the repeal.
of the high duties or prohibitions complained of ...
When there is no probability that any such repeal can
be procured, it seems a bad method of compensating
the injury done to certain classes of our people, to do
another injury to ourselves, not only to those classes,
but to almost all other classes of them.1 77
Through much of 2017 and 2018 Trump's critics essentially argued that
the administration's tariffs and threats of tariffs did more "injury to
ourselves" without much prospect of producing "repeal" of activities in
other countries that disserve American economic interests.17 8 The Trump
team disagreed and, if nothing else, got other countries' to the bargaining
table. They also got some revised terms of trade, almost always to the
benefit of traditional American industry and agriculture.
As the Administration reached revised trade deals and shelved other
threatened actions, it became clear that the Trump team's major trade
dispute is with China. The Trump team's "diagnosis" about Chinese
177 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OFNATIONS 490 (Edwin Cannan, ed.; London,
Methuen, 1961).
178 Indeed, that was the entire thrust of Paul Krugman's data-free op-ed mentioned
above. See Krugman, supra note 51.
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behavior has been "about the same as previous Administrations."'
7 9 The
difference is that Mr. Trump-not wedded to the narratives of the Bush-
Clinton period--carried through on his pledge to get tough. It remains
to be seen whether the outcome is a new overall trade deal or an overall
unwinding of the entanglement of the Chinese and American economies.
What is clear-and the business community needs to understand-is
that Trump's rhetoric and occasionally cringe-worthy tactics have
changed overall attitudes toward China in Washington, in Brussels, and
beyond. The accepted narrative now is that something must be done
about China's mercantilist opportunism. In Washington, there is broad
support for "a more strategic outlook with respect to competition with
China,"iso indeed "a strategy to cooperate and compete with a China that
is decidedly illiberal at home and abroad, even if we wish it were
otherwise."'8 ' Tariffs have been the headline-grabbing tool, but stricter
controls on exports to China and much stricter review of Chinese
investment into the United States will continue to be part of the mix.
By mid-2019, it also became clear that the Trump team did not intend
to blow up the multilateral WTO system as much as allow it to atrophy;
the administration focused on bilateral dealings, whether or not WTO-
permissible. With the WTO Appellate Body paralyzed by lack of new
appointees-a strategy that had actually started under the Obama
Administration-WTO enforcement mechanisms are essentially
reverting to those of the 1947-1994 GATT. We can expect that the
Trump team will be willing to engage the WTO on these terms,
celebrating wins before WTO panels and treating unfavorable decisions
as effectively advisory opinions. Compliance with WTO rulings has
never been 100%-from neither the United States nor the EU. And
China has consistently engaged in mechanisms to avoid implementing
WTO decisions that seem adverse to core interests. So the irony here is
that the Trump administration's overall attitude to the WTO is now closer
to what has been the Chinese attitude for at least a decade.
For the business community, the most important lesson is that we are
now past the "end of history" moment when people naively believed that
179 Carl Schonander, Presentation at the Daniel Morgan Graduate School, The U.S.-
China Economic Relationship: Paradigm Shift or More of the Same? (April 18, 2018)
(on file with the author).
190Id.
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Debate, FOREIGNAFF. (July/Aug. 2018).
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capitalist technocracy had triumphed and companies were free to trot the
globe and make money. A new geo-political competition will strongly
influence the global business environment for the foreseeable future.
History is back.

